摘要
连锁董事是一个非常普遍而独特的现象,对企业的行为和绩效有着重要影响。在系统回顾30多年来相关研究的基础上,本文首先对多种理论观点进行了整合,提出连锁董事具有"双刃剑"的作用。一方面,兼任和连锁增强了连锁董事履职的能力,他们可以通过导管机制与信号机制把丰富的人力和社会资本转化为企业的优势与绩效;另一方面,董事的兼任及连锁关系,尤其在超过一定界限之后,又会削弱他们履职的动机,降低其投入度和独立性,损害董事会运行的效率、效果乃至企业绩效。然后,本文引入制度、企业、团队和个人等多个层面的情境因素,分析外部情境和内部过程对连锁董事作用的影响。一方面,制度缺失、企业发展困境和董事会团队构成的不完备等因素提高了企业对连锁董事资本的需求,会正向调节连锁董事对企业的价值;另一方面,提出连锁董事面临的多重身份认同问题会影响其履职的动机,并讨论了企业声誉、人际关系和激励支持等因素对连锁董事加强身份认同、克服负面影响并加强履职动机的积极作用。最后,本文提出了一个完整的连锁董事研究框架,并讨论了未来研究的方向和对管理实践的启示。
Interlocking directorates are directors who hold multiple director positions in more than one firms.Their multiple directorships build up interlock relations and networks among firms.As a widespread and unique phenomenon,interlocking directorates have significant influence on firms＇ behaviors and performance.There are numerous viewpoints,different conclusions and controversies in researches on interlocking directorates which need review,integration and discussion.On the base of the review of researches on interlocking directorates of the past 30 years,firstly,this study integrate numerous theoretical viewpoints and argue that interlocking directorates have double-edged influences on firms.On the one side,interlocks could transform their abundant human and social capital to firm advantages and performance via conduit mechanism and signal mechanism.As the boundary spanners among firms,interlock directors could facilitate the turnover and co-optation of resources and become the channel for information transfer and communication among firms.Multiple directorships and interlock relations can be reliable signals for firms＇ status,reputation and legitimacy,which is helpful for firms to get supports and trusts from stakeholders.On the other side,possessing multiple directorship and interlock relations,especially exceed certain boundary conditions,could decrease their incentives like work engagement and independence,which could damage the efficiency and effectiveness of board operation and even firm performance.Busy directors and overloaded boards do not have enough time and energy to engaged in their jobs and their motivations for hardworking would be influenced by the potential costs and low revenues from job involvement.At the same time,interlock directors are embedded in inter-organizational and interpersonal relations and elite class,they could not do their job independendy.Secondly,this study bring in some contextual factors from institution,organization,team and individual levels to analyze the influence of external situation and inner process on interlocks＇ values and incentives.On the one side,institutional voids,development difficulties of firms and composition incompleteness of boards would determine firms＇ demand on interlocking directorates＇ capital,which could positively moderate the value of interlocks for firms.As these conditions bring great uncertainties to firms and compel firms rely more on their board capital.On the other side,as a boundary spanner,interlocking directors have the problem of multiple identifications which could influence their performance incentives.Firms＇ reputations and goals,team members＇ interpersonal relationship,interactions and reputations,and work incentives and supports,tenure and expertise of directors are all helpful for interlocking directors to strengthen their organizational,team or role identification and work incentives and overcome above negative effects caused by multiple directorship and interlock relations at the same time.Thirdly,this study present an integrated research framework for interlocking directorates which describe the relations among interlocking directors＇ capital,incentives and influential factors.This study argue that effective interlocking directors must have high expertise and reputation,strong motivation for engagement and independence and favorable inside and outside contextual factors at the same time,none is dispensable.Future research should pay more attention on micro mechanisms and realistic background of interlocks,study the relationship between firms＇ demand on directors and interlocking directors＇ functions,and try to solve the problem of interlocking directors＇ multiple identifications and low engagement and non-independent.Several practical implications for firms and market regulators are discussed at the end of the paper.
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第6期59-70,共12页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"网络制度视角下高管团队企业合法性行动网络及与组织学习能力关系研究"(71272136)
关键词
连锁董事
资源依赖理论
董事动机
不确定性
身份认同理论
interlocking directorates
resource dependency theory
director incentives
uncertainty
identity theory
