摘要
将既有企业的创新政策划分为两类:"鼓励员工创新"政策和"拒绝员工创新"政策,是否采取"鼓励员工创新"政策成为既有企业的一项重要决策。本文通过构筑既有企业与员工的多期博弈模型,剖析了既有企业创新政策选择决策的影响因素。研究发现:机会转化为商业化发明的概率越大、可商业化的发明产生的收益越大,则既有企业越倾向于采取"鼓励员工创新"政策;在企业内部开发机会时员工分享的收益越大、给定项目的产出越大、有风险类型项目的风险越小、员工发现机会的概率越大,则既有企业越倾向于采取"拒绝员工创新"政策。最后讨论了本研究的管理启示与研究不足。
The enterprise has two different kinds of innovation polices： the policy of encouraging employees to have innovation and the policy of forbidding employee to have innovation. To encourage employees to have innovation or to forbid employees to have innovation is an important decision for enterprises to make. Based on the multi- period game model of enterprises and employees,this paper analyzes the factors which will influence enterprises＇ choice of two different kinds of innovation polices. This study has found that the greater the probability that opportunities are translated into commercial inventions,and the greater the benefit that the commercial inventions may generate,enterprises are more likely to choose the policy of encouraging employees to have innovation; when opportunities are developed in enterprises,the greater the employee can share the benefit of project,the greater the output of a given project,the smaller the risk of the risky project,and the greater the probability that employees will find opportunities,the enterprises are more likely to choose the policy of forbidding employees to have innovation. In the end,the management implications and limitations are discussed in this paper.
出处
《科研管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第6期45-56,共12页
Science Research Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目"运营环境下的拍卖机制及其应用研究"(批准号71171053
起止时间:2012.1-2015.12)
国家自然科学基金资助项目"新企业商业模式调适的过程
驱动因素及绩效作用机制研究"(批准号71302176
起止时间:2014.01-2016.12)
河北省社会科学基金项目"基于沉淀成本的新常态下河北省混合所有制经济发展路径研究"(批准号HB15YJ116
起止时间:2015.7-2016.6)
关键词
员工创新
创新政策
博弈模型
employee innovation
innovation policy
game model
