摘要
以漓江流域为例,基于演化博弈的视角探究了跨界流域上下游政府之间的利益均衡及生态补偿机制。理论研究发现,在跨界流域中仅仅通过地方政府自身演化无法达到最优稳定均衡策略(上游保护,下游补偿),必须引入上级政府的激励约束机制才能确定实现最优稳定均衡策略时的参数条件。实证测算出漓江流域的环境保护成本约占该流域地区总产值的5.59%,其中74%的环境保护成本应当由下游的广东省进行补偿。为实现最优稳定策略均衡,还须来自于中央政府至少2倍于环境保护成本的惩罚约束。
How to establish an effective ecological compensation mechanism to protect the ecological environment and balance the interests of all the parties in the river basin has become an urgent problem to be solved. Taking the Lijiang River Basin as an example, the paper explores the interests balance and ecological compensation mechanism between the upstream and downstream government based on the evolutionary game theory. It is found that the optimal equilibrium strategy （upstream protection, downstream compensation） is not achieved by local government itself, and the parameters of the optimal stable equilibrium can be determined by the incentive and constraint mechanism of higher authorities. The cost of environmental protection in the Lijiang River Basin is about 5.59% of the total output value of the river basin, and 74% of the cost of the environmental protection should be compensated by Guangdong province. In order to achieve the optimal stable strategy equilibrium, the central government＇s penalty constraint is at least 2 twice as much as the cost of environmental protection.
出处
《经济地理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第6期42-49,共8页
Economic Geography
基金
桂林市人民政府立项课题(201500001
201500009)
国家自然科学基金项目(71573282)
中南大学研究生创新项目(2016zzts208)
关键词
流域生态补偿
演化博弈
漓江流域
利益均衡
basin ecological compensation
evolutionary game theory
Lijiang basin
interest balance
