摘要
为设计有效的PPP轨道交通项目监管激励机制,分析了现行项目监管体系弊端,提出了完善PPP轨道交通项目监管组织的建议.依据监管机构需承担的经济和质量监管责任,构建了包括政府、监管机构和项目公司的多任务委托代理激励模型.根据激励相容和参与约束条件对模型进行了求解.结果表明,最有效的激励机制是政府预设合理监管目标值对监管机构进行奖惩,督促监管机构对项目公司加大监管力度.政府则根据监管机构反馈的监管信息,对项目公司采取相应的策略和措施.
To design an effective PPP rail transit project supervision incentive mechanism, and to improve current government regulatory system defects, a new PPP rail transit project supervision organization structure is proposed in this paper. According to the responsibility of supervision organization for economic and quality supervising tasks in the PPP rail transit project, the incentive mechanism with multi-task principal-agent model is constructed, which includes government, project supervision organization and SPV. Solution of the model is got in accordance with the incentive compatibility and participation constraint. The results show that the most effective incentive mechanism is that government should make rewards and punishments to the supervision organization with reasonable presuppose supervising goals, which enforce the supervision organization intensify supervising the SPV. Based on feedback information from the supervision organization, government can take the corresponding strategies and measures to the SPV.
出处
《交通运输系统工程与信息》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2016年第3期1-7,共7页
Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(14YJCZH186)
江西省社会科学'十二五'规划项目(15GL19)~~
关键词
交通运输经济
项目监管激励机制
多任务委托代理模型
PPP轨道交通项目
监管组织结构
transportation economy
incentive mechanism for project supervising
multitask principal-agent model
public-private partnership rail transit project
supervision organization structure
