摘要
自上世纪90年代以来,乡镇政府与村级权力出于相互需要形成"乡村利益共同体",乡镇政府默许村干部获取某些灰色收入作为补偿或激励,以调动其工作积极性,但也引发大量基层矛盾冲突。鉴于大量矛盾源于村级权力缺乏规范,基层政府推行了村级权力规范化改革,有效遏制了村级权力滥用和贪污腐败现象,提高了群众满意度,降低了信访量。但改革急剧压缩了村干部谋取灰色收入的空间,在正当利益吸引力不足情况下,村干部工作积极性明显下降,趋向于消极作为,乡村治理也受到消极影响。为了激励村干部,应提高其合法经济收益和社会性收益,以增强村干部职位的吸引力。在村级权力得到规范化的同时,应减轻对村干部的工作积极性和治理动力的损害。
Since the 1990 's,an ‘interests community'was formed for the mutual need of township government and village organizations. The township government would allow the village cadres to obtain certain gray incomes as compensation or incentive for work. After the standardization of village level power,the village cadres lost the space to seek the gray income. However,the legitimate income cannot provide enough interest for the situation,and the enthusiasm of village cadres was significantly reduced,which had a negative impact on rural governance. The standardization of village level power could effectively restrain the abuse of power and the corruption,and improve the satisfaction of the masses,however,it could not solve the problem of inadequate governance power. How to solve the problem of the power is a serious and realistic problem that needs to be solved in the current rural governance.
出处
《南京农业大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第4期53-59,156,共7页
Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition)
