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投资者保护不足与企业破坏性成长:理论与实证 被引量:4

Lack of Investor Protection and Destructive Growth: Theoretical Analysis and Its Demonstration
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摘要 本文引入微观法与金融学的研究成果,构建了一个从投资者保护不足,到企业投融资行为扭曲,最终衍生为破坏性成长的理论解释框架,并基于国内外相关文献综述和国内上市公司数据进行了实证检验,结果显示:国内投资者保护程度明显不足,由此造成的企业过度投资和投资效率低下引发规模扩张和效益提升的背离,也就是所谓的破坏性成长。因此,经济转型也需要关注微观层面的制度校正,通过完善投资者保护机制最终约束微观主体的投融资行为,提高资金配置效率。 Efficiency of micro enterprise financing and investing is the key to the economic transformation, but the de- structive growth of Chinese enterprises is a puzzle. In view of the limitation of modern financing structure theory in explaining this phenomenon, this paper, starting from the perspective of institutional analysis, makes use of the latest research results of the micro law and finance to construct a theoretical framework from the lack of investor protection, to corporate investment and financing behavior distortion, to destructive growth finally, and conducts an empirical research based on the literature review and the related data of domestic listed corporations. The results show that there is a relatively obvious lack of investor protec- tion in China, giving rise to enterprises' over-investment and low investment efficiency which lead to the deviation of enterpri- ses' size expansion and efficiency improvement, the so-called destructive growth. Therefore, in the process of economic transformation, enough attention should be paid to the micro system correction, such as improving the investor protection mechanism, standardizing corporate investing and financing behaviors ; which will be conducive to the smooth transition of economic system.
作者 王韧 马红旗
出处 《财经论丛》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第6期38-46,共9页 Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
基金 中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2014M550527)
关键词 投资者保护 破坏性成长 法与金融学 investor protection destructive growth law and finance
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