摘要
本文以沪深两市2007-2014年发生非流动资产处置损益的A股上市公司为样本,分析处置非流动资产的盈余管理动机以及公司董事会特征对真实盈余管理的抑制作用。研究结果表明:上市公司为了实现扭亏的目标,存在利用非流动资产处置收益实施盈余管理的行为;董事会治理机制中,董事长与总经理两职合一、独立董事比例和董事会开会次数与真实盈余管理水平显著负相关;相对于民营上市公司,国有上市公司真实盈余管理动机更强,其董事长与总经理两职合一和独立董事比例抑制盈余管理的功能优于民营上市公司,而民营上市公司的董事会开会次数的监督功能更为有效。
Using data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges with non-current asset disposal gains and losses in the period of 2007 - 2014, this paper analyzes the earnings management motivation of non-current assets disposal and the control effect of board of directors on earnings management. The results of the study are as follows ： The listed compa- nies will make use of the disposal of non-current assets to turn loss into profit in current profit-loss year; In the mechanism of board of directors, the size of the board does not have a direct impact on the real earnings management, hut there is a signifi- cant negative conrrelation between the general manager duality, the proportion of independent directors, the frequency of board meetings and the real earnings management; Compared with the private listed companies, state-owned enterprises are more in- clined to choose real earnings management for earnings manipulation. In the state-owned enterprises, both the general manager duality and the proportion of independent directors are more perfect, whereas in the private enterprises the supervisory role of board meetings is more effective.
出处
《财经论丛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第7期68-75,共8页
Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
基金
财政部全国会计领军人才培养工程特殊支持计划(kjljrc201409)
武汉市黄鹤英才计划(hhyc20140346)
2015年河南省高等学校重点科研资助项目(15A630067)
关键词
董事会特征
真实盈余管理
非流动资产处置
股权性质
characteristics of board of directors
real earnings management
non-current assets disposal
ownership proportion
