上市公司委托代理成本内生时变特征的实证判别与理论猜想被引量：6

Empirical Analysis and Theoretical Conjecture on Endogenous Time Varying Characteristics of the Agent Cost of Listed Companies

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摘要通过选取中国A股市场上市公司2003年1月至2015年6月的季度和半年度数据,基于个体固定效应面板数据模型,实证检验委托代理成本随着公司上市时间的变化是否存在一般性变化规律。实证结果表明,委托代理成本随着公司上市时间的变化呈现出显著的"M"形时变特征,且不同的数据样本频率以及是否加入相应的控制变量对上述结果并没有产生影响,因此中国上市公司委托代理成本存在具有内生性特征的时变规律。理论猜想认为:硬性上市条件约束、上市亢奋和针对窃取利益与维护职位的权衡会使企业的委托代理成本在上市后产生持续波动的内生性时变特征。 This paper selects quarterly and semi-annual data from 2003 to June 2015 of listed companies in A share market in China, using the individual fixed effect panel data model, and tests whether the agent cost has a general variation law or not along with the change over listed time when adding or not adding control variables respectively, and then judges whether the agent cost of listed companies has time effect and endogenous. The em- pirical results show that： the agent cost has a significant M-type time varying characteristic along with the change over listed time, and the different data sample frequency and whether or not to join the corresponding control variables have no effect on the above empirical re- sults. Therefore, the agent cost of Chinese listed companies has time effect of endogenous characteristics. The theoretical conjecture that the mandatory listing conditions lead to the a- gent cost is relatively low at the beginning of listing, but the management investment im- pulse caused by the listing excitement urges the agent cost to increase gradually, then the in- formation disclosure will prompt managers to be dutiful so the agent cost decreases again, at last the managers＇ weighing between stealing interests and maintaining positions will make the agent cost fluctuate continually.

作者丁志国张洋丁钰洋

机构地区吉林大学数量经济研究中心吉林大学

出处《数量经济技术经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第9期95-111,共17页 Journal of Quantitative & Technological Economics

关键词上市公司委托代理成本时间效应内生性 Listed Companies Agent Cost Time Effect Endogenous

分类号 F275 [经济管理—企业管理]

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