摘要
以一个由零售商和供应商组成的二级供应链系统为研究对象,考虑到零售商在销售季开始前预售产品,供应商按MTO模式进行生产。构建以零售商为主者、供应商为从者的"委托-代理"模型,研究在供应商生产成本为不对称信息的情况下零售商最优采购合同设计问题,并与完全信息条件下的最优采购合同进行比较。结果表明,信息不对称不仅降低了零售商的收益,同时也降低了供应链整体的收益,但供应商可以从中获利。
In the customer-centric market environment full of competition,demands are sensitive not only to the price but also the time.A two-tier supply chain consisting of a retailer and a supplier is studied.Supposing the retailer presells products ahead of selling season and the supplier produces under MTO mode.A principal-agent model in which the retailer acts as the game leader and the supplier acts as the game follower is set in order to investigate the optimal procurement contract under the asymmetric information about the producing cost of the supplier and compare it with the contract under symmetric information.The conclusion shows that the asymmetric information hurts both the retailer and the supply chain,but benefits the supplier.
出处
《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》
CAS
2016年第4期474-479,共6页
Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71471126)
关键词
合同理论
信息不对称
预售策略
备货时间
委托代理模型
contract theory
asymmetric information
advance selling
lead time
principal-agent model
