基于消费者异质性偏好的零售商抗衡势力研究被引量：18

A Research of Retailer's Countervailing Power Based on Heterogeneity Consumer Preference

导出

摘要本文将消费者偏好特征引入到买方抗衡势力形成的分析框架中,构建消费者异质偏好视角下的买方抗衡势力形成模型,并在此基础上分析买方抗衡势力的市场效应。结果表明:当消费者对零售商的偏好异质时,拥有较强偏好的零售商能够获得买方抗衡势力,且消费者偏好增强能够提高该零售商的买方抗衡势力,改善消费者效用与社会福利。本研究一定程度上丰富了现有关于买方抗衡势力的理论研究,为企业竞争战略和产业规制政策提供了新的理论依据。 This research topic cames from the argument about the countervailing power.Most of literature concentrate on the characteristics of suppliers and retailers,but do not reach relatively consistent conclusions and could not accurately distinguish the sources of the countervailing power from the changes in the industrial structure or from retailers＇ behavior.In particular,factors outside the industrial chain,such as preferences and behavior of the consumers,have important implications for the accurate study of the formation mechanism of the countervailing power.In this study heterogeneous consumer preferences are introduced into a dynamic game model,and the formation mechanism and effects of countervailing power are considered.The results show that the heterogeneous consumer preference is a necessary condition for the supplier and the retailer with stronger consumer preference to negotiate and to cooperate.However,they will negotiate and reach an agreement only when the profit sharing rule is within a certain interval.When consumer preferences towards the retailers are heterogeneous,the dominant retailer possesses a stronger bargaining capacity.The retailer＇s countervailing power increases with its consumer preference.In addition,countervailing power can improve the consumer＇s utility as well as the social welfare.The existing literature about the formation of the countervailing power are enriched and some theoretical reference for the firms and regulatory agencies is provided through this study.

作者李凯苏慧清刘智慧

机构地区东北大学工商管理学院

出处《中国管理科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第9期53-63,共11页 Chinese Journal of Management Science

基金国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172150)

关键词买方抗衡势力消费者偏好价格决策合作博弈 countervailing power consumer preference price decisions cooperative game

分类号 F062.9 [经济管理—政治经济学]

引文网络
相关文献

参考文献31

1Chen Zhiqi. Defining buyer power [J]. Antitrust Bulle- tin, 2008, (53): 241-249.
2Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- ment. Buyer power of large scale multiproduct retailers [R]. Background Paper by the Secretariat, Roundtable on Buying Power, DAFFE/CLP (98) 21, Paris, 1998.
3Segal I. Collusion, exclusion, and inclusion in random- order bargaining [J]. Review of Economics Studies, 2003, 70 (2): 439-460.
4Raskovich A. Pivotal buyers and bargaining position [J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 2003, 51(4): 405-426.
5Katz M L. The welfare effects of third degree price dis- crimination in intermediate goods markets[J]. American Economic Review, 1987,77(1): 154-167.
6Inderst R, Valletti T M. Buyer power and the "water- bed effect" [ J ]. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2011, 59(1): 1-20.
7Dana J. Buyer groups as strategic commitments[J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, 74 (2): 470- 485.
8King S P. Buyer groups, antitrust and outsiders[J]. E- conomic Record, 2013, 89 (284): 1-18.
9Galbraith J K. American capitalism: The concept of countervailing power[J]. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1952: 119-121.
10Stigler G J. The economist plays with blocks[J]. A- merican Economic Review, 1954, 44 (2) : 7-14.

二级参考文献28

1黄祖庆,达庆利.直线型再制造供应链决策结构的效率分析[J].管理科学学报,2006,9(4):51-57. 被引量：133
2Schultmann F, Zumkeller M, Rentz O. Modeling reverse logistic tasks within closed-loop supply chains: An example from the automotive industry[J].European Journal of Operational Research, 2006,171(3):1033-1050.
3Guide J V D R,Vav Wassenhove L N. The evolution of closed-loop supply chain research[J].Operations Research,2009,57(1):10-18.
4Karakayli I, Emir-Farinas H, Akeali E. An analysis of decentralized collection and processing of end-od-life products[J].Journal of operations management,2007,25(6):1161-1183.
5Choi S C. Price competition in a channel structure with a common retailer[J].Marketing Science,1991,10(4):271-134.
6Choi S C. Price competition in a duopoly common retailer channel [J].Journal of Retailer,1996,72(2):117-134.
7Shi Jianmai,Zhang Gouqing, Sha Jichuang. optimal production and pricing policy for a closed loop system[J].Resources, Conservation and Recycling,2011,55(6):639-647.
8Jean-Pierre K, Pierre' D,Ali G. Production planning of a hybrid manufacturing-remanufacturing system under uncertainty within a closed-loop supply chain[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2012,135(1):81-93.
9Zhao Hao. Raising awareness and signaling quality to uniformed consumers: A price-advertising model[J]. Marking Science,2000,19(4):390-396.
10Karl Inderfurth.Optimal policies in hybrid manufacturing/remanufacturing systems with product substitution[J].International Journal of Production Economics.2003(3)