摘要
针对由多个风险中性供应商和单个损失厌恶组装商构成的组装供应链.给出了批发价格契约下各节点企业的均衡策略,发现组装商的最优订货量小于集中化决策下的最优订货量.在此基础上,数值分析表明:当零部件种类数给定时,组装商损失厌恶系数越大,组装商的最优订货量越低;并且随着零部件种类数的增加,组装商损失厌恶系数对组装商的最优订货量的影响程度增大.当组装商损失厌恶系数给定时,零部件种类数越多,组装商的最优订货量也越低;并且随着组装商损失厌恶系数的增加,零部件种类数对组装商的最优订货量的影响程度也增大.引入价格补贴策略设计了协调契约,并通过数值分析,对协调契约的有效性进行了验证.
This paper investigates an assembly supply chain consisting of multiple risk-neutral suppliers and a loss-averse assembler. Firstly, the paper derives the equilibrium strategy of each enterprise under a wholesale price contract and shows that the assembler＇s optimal order quantity is less than that of a centralized system. Moreover, the numerical analysis shows that, for a given number of components, the assembler＇s optimal order quantity decreases in its loss-aversion coefficient, and the impact of the assembler＇s loss-aversion coefficient on its optimal order quantity increases. For a given assembler＇s loss-aversion coefficient, the assembler＇s optimal order quantity decreases in the number of the components, and the impact of the components＇ number on the assembler＇s optimal order quantity increases. Then, a coordination contract is designed by introducing the price-subsidy policy. The effectiveness of the coordination contract is verified by a numerical analysis.
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2016年第4期504-514,共11页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助重点项目(71531003)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71101019)
教育部人文社科资助项目(12YJA630174)
关键词
组装供应链
损失厌恶
价格补贴
协调
assembly supply chain
loss-aversion
price-subsidy
coordination
