摘要
通过构建Stackelberg博弈模型,本文分析了农产品市场中不同渠道模式下家庭农场最优决策行为。研究发现:政府直销区市场波动增大以及家庭农场风险规避程度变大,会导致家庭农场放弃在政府直销区销售农产品;相比于松散型"家庭农场+公司"模式,紧密型"家庭农场+公司"模式可以同时提高家庭农场与公司的效用;在一定条件下,家庭农场选择同时在两渠道中销售农产品既可以规避风险又可以提高收入。
Through developing Stackelberg Game Model,this paper analyzes family farms＇ optimal decision under different channels,and puts forward the strategy of choosing the best distribution channel mode of family farm. Results indicate that family farms will give up the channel of governmental direct selling areas,with the increases of fluctuation and risk aversion degree of family farm in government direct selling area market; compared with the＂family farm＋company＂loose-type model,the ＂family farm＋company＂close-type model can raise the utility of family farm and company; in certain condition,selling agricultural products both in government channel and company channel,family farms can not only avoid risk,but also benefit more.
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第10期130-137,共8页
Commercial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目"考虑农户行为偏好的农产品供应链协调机制设计研究"
项目编号:71371086
关键词
家庭农场
农产品供应链
渠道模式选择
合作契约
family farm
agricultural product supply chain
channel-selecting
partnership contract
