摘要
公共物品博弈中搭便车的非合作行为会导致个体理性而集体非理性的社会困境。沟通机制是破解这一困境的有效方法,但也会使个体因控制幻觉而对博弈结果过度自信,从而对公共物品供给产生影响。本文在带有廉价磋商机制的门限公共物品框架下,考察了个体过度自信水平对其公共物品供给量的影响以及社会偏好的调节作用。实验结果表明,个体过度自信水平与其公共物品供给量显著相关,且社会偏好正向调节了这一关系:搭便车者的过度自信水平与其公共物品供给量负相关,而社会偏好者的过度自信水平与其公共物品供给量正相关。本文实验结果表明,过度自信虽然会损害个体利益,但对集体利益的影响并非总是负面的。
This article provides a new perspective on how overconfidence interacts with heterogeneous social preferences in shaping people＇s decisions in social dilemmas like public goods games. Recent studies in behavioral and experimental economics show that there is heterogeneity in individual preferences, and beliefs about other group members＇ contributions influence individuals＇ contributions in a public goods game. As contributions to public goods depend on belief, any systematic bias in belief, such as overconfidence, should also influence contributions. Meanwhile, the free riding behavior in public goods game will result in social dilemma which is referred to conflicts between individual and collective interest. In order to solve this problem, communication is often introduced to public goods, but it also brings overconfidence according to the illusion of control theory. This paper investigates the effects of overconfidence on public goods contribution and the moderating role of social preferences in a threshold public goods framework with cheap talk. A threshold public goods imposes an additional incentive/punishment on the linear public goods, to better capture the mechanism in some real-life situations. We first measure the level of overconfidence using a general knowledge task, then conduct two threshold public goods games with cheap talk, in which subjects are asked to conduct 90-second non-binding verbal communication, contribute to the public goods and indicate their beliefs about their partners＇ contribution and communication effect. Our design allows us to build a measure of overconfidence not only from abstract, general knowledge tasks, but also based on belief biases of communication effect in public goods game. Experimental results indicate contributions are significant positively correlated with overconfidence, and the interaction of overconfidence and heterogeneous preferences affects individuals＇ public goods contributions： on the one hand, overconfidence reduces contributions of self-interested individuals; meanwhile it improves cooperation willingness of pro-social individuals. These results indicate that although overconfidence always damage individuals＇ benefits, it may facilitate collective cooperation and interests. These results contribute to the understanding of the role of psychological biases in economic decisions.
作者
李建标
殷西乐
王鹏程
汪敏达
Li Jianbia Yin Xile Wang Pengeheng Wang Minda(Business School/China Academy of Corporate Governance, Nankai University Collaborative Innovation Center for China Economy MBA School, Zhejiang Gongshang University Business School, Tianjin University of Finance Economics School of Economies ＆ Management, Southeast University)
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第5期139-148,共10页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71673152、71372094)资助
关键词
过度自信
社会偏好
廉价磋商
门限公共物品
实验
Overconfidence
Social Preferences
Cheap Talk
Threshold Public Goods
Experiment
