摘要
资本市场的并购行为导致公司控制权的重新配置,而基于不同治理结构与契约关系的控制权配置会产生不同的效率。控制权配置的效率评价具有不同的选择标准,传统的帕累托标准和希克斯标准仅仅考虑到股东的利益变化,而利益相关者标准则扩展了利益变动的主体范围。虽然不同的效率标准与股东至上逻辑具有相容性,同时在一定的条件下可以相互转化,但由于利益相关者标准依据的是社会福利观,并且与之对应的是一种更为有效的公司治理结构,因而是最优的效率选择。
Merger and Acquisition can cause re-allocation of corporation's control rights in capital market,and the allocation of control rights on the basis of different governance structure has different efficiency.The different criteria are used to evaluate the allocation efficiency of control rights,the traditional Pareto criterion and Hicks criterion only think about the stockholder's interests,but the paper puts forward stakeholder criterion which expands the scope of interest groups.This paper thinks that though different criterion and shareholder primacy logic is compatible and mutual transformable,stakeholder criterion is an optimal selection because it is corresponding with social welfare standpoints and more efficient government structure.
出处
《中南财经政法大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第1期3-9,共7页
Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"股权分置改革背景下企业投票权规则
控制权配置与效率选择"(07BFX048)
关键词
控制权配置
效率评价
帕累托标准
希克斯标准
利益相关者标准
Allocation of Control Rights
Efficiency Evaluation
Pareto Criterion
Hicks Criterion
Stakeholder Criterion
