摘要
网络预约专车因其便捷性、补贴政策吸引了大量乘客,对传统出租车市场造成了极大冲击。专车的高额补贴政策是否会持续?抑或占领市场后提高价格,进而损害消费者利益?本文通过建立完全信息静态博弈模型,分析两种补贴策略对专车价格及乘客选择的影响。研究结果表明:目前的补贴政策难以长期维持,进一步地模型计算得出专车的合理价格区间,有利于网络预约专车市场的有序发展。
The network booking tailored taxi has developed rapidly and had a severe impact on the traditional taxi market with its convenient service and its subsidy policy in our country. Will the higher subsidies be sustainable,or will the network booking taxi company increase its price,thus hurting its consumers？ This paper establishes a complete information static game model to analyze the effect of two kinds of subsidy policy on taliored taxi＇s price and the choice of the passengers. It＇s found that the subsidy policy is difficult to maintain in the long run. The paper further figures out the range of reasonable price for tailored taxi,which will be of help for an orderly development of the talored taxi market.
出处
《财经论丛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第1期105-112,共8页
Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
基金
国家社科基金资助项目(13BJY021)
关键词
专车
补贴政策
完全信息静态博弈
纳什均衡
tailored taxi
subsidy policy
complete information static game
Nash equilibrium
