摘要
本文探讨为什么解决技术密集型部门和最终产品部门之间人力资本"错配"问题,是中国经济稳增长政策面临的难题,并借助"新卡尔多事实",关注全社会信息共享和知识传递的人力资本匹配效应。研究发现:在经济转型过程中,人力资本市场化配置可能失灵,易引发错配,致使创新动力不足。如果政府通过规制技术型企业,促其转型为创新型企业,虽完美解决了错配,但经济增长将面临下行压力,且经济受到人力资本供给的波动而不稳定。所以,人力资本错配是伴随稳增长的一个"难题"。尽管对于转型中的经济体而言,完美解决人力资本错配可能不是有效的,但提升社会的信息共享和知识传递水平,为人力资本外溢提供有效渠道,有利于实现人力资本在部门间的适宜匹配,可以成为推动整个社会创新和经济稳增长的实施条件。本文的政策含义是:当前中国经济处于资本积累效果和人口红利逐渐消失的时期,需要在保障人力资本形成的激励条件下,允许一定的人力资本错配,同时规制技术型企业,促其创新,与此同时,扩大人力资本外溢渠道,释放更多的教育和知识红利,推进知识生产与消费一体化过程,从而推动创新和实现增长跨越。
Summary： Today, both the scale and scope of Chinese human capital （HC） have achieved a high level. However, misallocation of HC hampers rapid economic growth; that is, high quality laborers are not perfectly matched with their work. This paper attempts to interpret （ 1 ） which frictions affect the process of HC distribution in China, （2） whether correcting HC misalloeations will destabilize China＇s economic growth （hence, a conundrum） and （3） whether alternatives exist to resolve the conundrum and achieve stable growth. We present an economic growth framework based on Romer （1990）. The adaptations primarily concern two conditions in China： （ 1 ） there are frequent fluctuations in the HC supply caused by the government＇s significant influence on China＇s education system, and （2） most Chinese firms are capital-intensive; that is, marginal output depends on capital investment other than HC. Intuitively, as universities and colleges are largely government funded, they cater to the needs of the government. Furthermore, patent protection is imperfect in China; firms are encouraged to remain capital-intensive and ignore the innovative abilities of HC. The fluctuating supply and insufficient demand result in HC misallocation, which is different from a general equilibrium setting. In the basic model of this paper, HC misallocation and less innovation lead to lower economic growth. Due to the enormous cost of reforming the funding system of China＇s higher education, we consider only changes in firms＇ profit functions. Inspired by Laffont ＆ Tirole （1993） , we assume a scheme in which firms＇ profits are taxed and their innovations are rewarded, and the taxation and rewards are balanced by the government under shocks. We prove that although the scheme can solve the misallocation problem, it embeds fluctuations in HC supply in aggregate production, such that negative growth rates are possible. Therefore, HC misallocation is a growth conundrum. To bypass the conundrum, we allow innovation to increase with the level of informational communication （information infrastructure [ IF] ）. Our analysis suggests that a high level of IF will elevate the economy from lower growth to higher growth. The intuition behind this result is unsophisticated： whereas HC is distributed among multiple firms, its aggregated innovation ability depends on the communication quality inside and outside the group. The truth of this theoretical result is tested using China＇s provincial-level data from 2001 to 2013. Overall, this paper suggests at least three implications： （ 1 ） HC misallocation cannot be resolved completely to avoid unstable economic growth; （2） a scheme that includes rewarding innovation can improve HC allocation and economic transformation, especially when patent protection is imperfect; and （3） IF is currently the key factor in promoting innovation by facilitating the joint communication of HC and information. Hence, it improves economic growth without completely correcting HC misallocation.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第3期18-31,共14页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家社会科学基金重大招标课题(12&ZD084)
安徽大学青年骨干教师培养项目(J01005139)
安徽大学人才引进科研建设项目(J10117700053)的资助
关键词
经济转型
人力资本错配
经济稳增长
Economic Transforming
Misallocation of Human Capital
Stable Growth
