摘要
基于双寡头企业R&D竞争模型,利用动力系统分支理论和混沌经济学原理,构建一个带有政府研发补贴的有限理性双寡头企业动态博弈模型,分析离散动态系统中政府研发补贴系数对R&D竞争均衡条件的限制作用及对整个双寡头市场运作状态的动态影响,并进行数值仿真。研究表明:1)Nash均衡条件下,合理的补贴系数取值范围应受到市场需求函数、有限理性企业R&D投入调速以及产品成本的约束。适当的补贴率有助于系统维稳,而不适当的补贴率则会使得R&D竞争进入混沌状态。2)补贴政策实行初期,市场会呈现出短暂的不均衡状态。双寡头企业前期R&D投入波动幅度大于利润波动幅度,且两者皆与补贴力度正相关。3)双寡头市场中,政府R&D补贴能够刺激企业加大R&D投入,并使得R&D投入调速较快的企业将取得更高的利润,而调速较慢的企业则会处于相对劣势。文章最后通过讨论给出政策层面上的相关建议,以期为相关研发补贴政策的制定提供参考。
Based on the classic duopoly games and branch theory of dynamic system and chaos economics principle, this paper creates a dynamic model of R＆D competition with government R＆D subsidy, analyzing the effects of R＆D subsidy on the R＆D competition＇ s Nash equilibrium and the whole market operation, while a numerical simulation is carried out. The research shows that： （1） Appropriate subsidy rates are largely limited by market demand function, adjustment speed of R＆D investment and product costs. Keeping R＆D subsidy rates within certain range helps system maintain equilibrium states. In other words, bifurcation or chaos could happen if R＆D subsidy coefficient falls out of range. （2） In the early stage of subsidy policy, the market could be in a short unstable state, in which the fluctuation range of R＆D investment is larger than that of profit margin, and both of them have a positive relationship with government R＆D subsidy rates. （ 3 ） Public R＆D subsidies encourage corporations to increase R＆D investment and enable corporations with faster adjustment speed to obtain higher return in dynamic duopoly games. At last, suggestions of subsidy strategies at policy level are given to provide reference for relevant R＆D subsidy policy formulation.
出处
《科研管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第3期135-143,共9页
Science Research Management
基金
重庆市决策咨询与管理创新计划重点项目<产业集群协作研究--面向重庆实践的方案>(cstc2013jccx B0021)
重庆市研究生科研创新项目(CYS16003)
关键词
R&D补贴
有限理性
混沌
R＆D competition
bounded rationality
chaos
