摘要
研究了提供公交车实时到站信息服务,对乘客出行行为的影响以及公交公司在基于自身利润最大化目标下,决策是否提供信息进行分析.模型中假设,理性的出行者随机到达车站或者利用公交信息提前规划自己的行程.计划出行的人数依赖于公交车的发车频率以及提供信息的质量的高低.基于固定需求的乘客出行分析,研究了公交公司在选择是否提供信息和设定运营频率以最大化利润.得到不同运营策略的公交公司的发车频率及最优利润.发现乘客利用信息成本越低,公交公司在提供信息方面越积极,公交公司可能在降低社会总成本的情况下落入"囚徒困境".如果乘客利用信息的成本较高,而信息提供成本较低,则可能出现一家公交公司提供信息而另一家通过增加服务频率来差异竞争的均衡结果.
In this paper, we study how the bus companies to provide real-time bus station information service will influence the passenger travel behavior, and do game research about whether the company will provide the information to the passenger under the four difference situations. This finding will help in designing the transportation management policies. The model assumes that users can come to the bus stop or rail station at random or they can plan their trips. The fraction of users who plan their trips depends on the frequency of service and on the quality of information provided. Based on the analysis the cost of travel, we got the equilibrium of system in the case of fixed demand. Also compares the bus frequency, the number of planning passenger, and the company net profit under different strategies. A numerical example is presented to verify the theoretical results , which are consistent with classical economics theory. The finding can be helpful the transportation management policies.
作者
田琼
柴娇龙
周畅
TIAN Qiong CHAI Jiao-long ZHOU Chang(School of Economics and Management, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China)
出处
《管理科学学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第3期98-104,共7页
Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071011
71271017
71471010)
中央基本科研业务费资助项目(YMF-16-JCTD-A-07).本文入选"第十三届全国青年管理科学与系统科学学术会议(2015年
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