摘要
为了解决在闭环供应链的回收过程中各节点在非对称信息下回收信号传递的问题,运用委托代理理论,研究在销售商回收过程中将回收时的可再制造件回收水平和质量预防水平作为信号传递给生产商,供生产商对其质量检查水平进行决策。研究结果表明:在销售商选择低质量预防水平作为公共知识时,主要以回收水平作为信号传递,随着回收水平提高,其自身道德风险降低,生产商支付激励金额下降,闭环供应链的整体收益最优,从而解决了回收时闭环供应链的协调问题。
This paper studies the problem of how to signal product quality in closed-loop supply chain. Based on the game theory and principal-agent relationship, the seller makes the decision of collection and quality prevention strategy, who may signal the type of collecting process investment level and quality prevention level to the producer in order to obtain the optimal incentive contract. We use the optimal theory to establish producer＇s quality decision control model and describe the rents. The simulation results will show that the seller has incentive to signal the type of collecting level and has not incentive to signal the type of quality prevention level. Meanwhile the whole closed-loop supply chain joint expected profits will increase, and then producer will reduce rents.
作者
曹华林
秦琼
景熠
CAO Hua-lin QIN Qiong JING Yi(School of Management, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400054, Chin)
出处
《重庆理工大学学报（社会科学）》
CAS
2017年第3期47-54,68,共9页
Journal of Chongqing University of Technology（Social Science）
关键词
闭环供应链
委托代理关系
信号传递
回收质量检查
closed-loop supply chain
principal-agent relationship
signaling game
collecting quality test
