摘要
通过建立C2C电商平台规则下的买卖双方不对称信息博弈模型,刻画不正当竞争策略中买家的评价行为,得出在线评论偏离真实性的原因:采取"好评返现"策略的卖家,获得高质量好评带来的销售量增益的同时增加了买家的当前收益,导致好评数偏高;买家遭受"差评威胁"时的妥协,激励了卖家采取"差评威胁"策略,导致差评数减少。应对策略:制定规则或法律,保护买家的人身安全,从而减少妥协率,增加卖家的威胁成本,遏制"差评威胁"的发生;制定标准化的评价内容,减少高、低质量好评造成的销售量差额;取消默认好评机制,且"好评返现"的奖励应由平台给出,禁止卖家返现,从而减少虚假好评数量。
This paper analyzes the incentive to deviate from the authenticity of online reviews in C2C ecommerce by establis- hing the asymmetric information game model between buyers and sellers in the rules of the C2C ecommerce platform and characterizing the evaluating behavior of the buyers in the unfair competition strategy. Results show that, with the high qual- ity praise, the seller who took the strategy of ＇ Praise Reward＇ obtained sales increasing, as well as, it exacerbated the ben- efit of the buyer, which leads to high number of praise. When suffering from ＇ Criticism Threat＇ , the buyer often comes to terms. While such behavior inspires the seller to take the ＇ Criticism Threat＇ strategy, resulting in a decrease in the number of negative comments. The countermeasures are as follows, to protect the personal safety of the buyer by making the rules or laws, thus can reduce the buyer compromise rate, increase the threat costs of the seller, as a result, curb the ＇ Criticism Threat＇. To make the content of comment standard, the buyer can give the standardizing comment. It can reduce the sales imbalance which caused by high and low quality praise. The default praise system should be canceled and ＇ Praise Reward＇ award should be given by the platform. At the same time, prohibit the seller＇s ＇ Praise Reward＇ strategy, so as to reduce the number of fake praise.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第4期100-103,共4页
Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71202155)
