摘要
立足于中国的制度环境,以2008—2014年中国A股上市公司的数据为样本,从同业参照效应角度实证检验新任高管对公司高管薪酬增长的影响,其结果表明,高管薪酬契约存在着同业参照效应,新任高管与高管薪酬增长正相关,发生新任高管事件的公司会倾向于采用同业参照效应提升高管的薪酬水平;进一步研究发现,当新任高管来自公司外部和公司的前任高管非正常离职时,这种倾向更强。上述结论可为国企高管薪酬改革提供借鉴与参考。
Based on the institutional environment of China,this paper uses the 2008—2014 data of China’s A-share listed companies to explore how to adjust its executive compensation contract and whether the company will promote the growth of executive compensation. We find out that there is a peer reference effect in the contracts of executive compensation,the new executives positively associates with executive compensation growth,and the company which has a new executive event will tend to use the peer reference effect to improve the level of executive compensation. Moreover,this tendency is stronger when the new executives come from outside and the former executives are abnormal turnover. The research of this paper is of great theoretical and practical significance to providing reference for the reform of the state-owned enterprise executives,and to deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises.
出处
《华东师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第2期163-172,共10页
Journal of East China Normal University（Humanities and Social Sciences）
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“大学治理、财务管理和价值增值的关系研究”(项目号:71573090)
国家社科基金项目“规范垄断行业企业高管薪酬问题研究”(项目号:09BJY031)
教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目“公平偏好、参照点效应与国企高管薪酬研究”(项目号:15YJC630087)
安徽省人文社科研究项目重点课题“外部治理、参照点效应与高管薪酬研究”(项目号:SK2015A300)
作者持续9年的关于高管薪酬问题研究的成果之一
关键词
新任高管
高管薪酬
同业参照效应
上市公司
国有企业
new executive
executive compensation
peer reference effect
listed companies
state-owned enterprises
