摘要
在努力影响产品需求、产品存在替代的市场环境里,考虑由一个销售商和两个制造商组成的供应链,在合作中销售商与一个制造商建立收益共享合作关系,与另一制造商建立批发价合作关系。在本文决策情形下,首先,论文从分散决策和集中决策视角研究了基于收益共享合约的供应链合作,得到了不同决策环境下的努力激励、产品定价和库存策略,以及供应链的协调机制。其次,论文研究了基于批发价合约的供应链合作,得到了分散决策和集中决策环境下的产品定价和库存策略,并论证了批发价合约依然无法实现供应链协调。接着,论文研究了销售商经营双产品的决策系统,得到了每个产品的定价、库存和努力激励策略,通过比较发现这些策略与收益共享合约、批发价合约下的决策策略存在差异,进而揭示了销售商的决策策略具有不一致性。最后,分析了销售商的决策策略不一致性对供应商的收益和供应链协调的影响,在此基础上,分别从参与企业决策地位对等、制造商处于决策主导地位、销售商处于决策主导地位三种情形,依次提出了规避销售商决策策略不一致的具体方案,进而协调或改善供应链的合作。
Revenue sharing contract has advantages for coordinating short life-cycle products. However, these advantages are gradually reduced due to theincreasing complexity of decisions involved in the supply chain system. For instance, when the marketing efforts of retailers influence the product demand,revenue sharing contract may reduce the marketing motivation of retailers in order to result in the failure of supply chain coordination. When two brands ofproducts with different procurement channels are concemed, the product substitution effect will impact the retailer＇s sale, which further creates difficulty forimplementing revenue sharing contract in such supply chains. Thus, it is imperative to study the impact of marketing efforts of retailer and product substitutionon the optimal decision making of each stakeholder （i.e. retailer, manufacturer） in supply chains and supply chain coordination. This paper studies supply chain coordination under two products with different brands, where product substitution effect is considered. The two productsare produced by different companies. It is assumed that the procurement of one product utilizes wholesale price contract, while the other follows revenuesharing contract. Products with the revenue sharing contract have low procurement cost and the risk of selling. Products with the wholesale price contractinvolve high procurement cost and selling risk. The retailer tends to adjust its marketing efforts to influence the demand and revenue of each product. Thus, thegoal of this work is to analyze the retailer＇s decision strategy and derive the optimal condition of supply chain coordination under the setting of single retailerand two manufacturers with different contracts considering marketing efforts and product substitution. Firstly, considering products with the revenue sharing contract, this paper derived the optimal marketing efforts, product price, inventory policy, andsupply chain coordination condition under both centralized and distributed decision-making settings. After considering products with the wholesale pricecontract, we derived the optimal product price and inventory policy under both centralized and distributed decision-making settings. We found as expected thatthe wholesale price contract cannot achieve supply chain coordination. Furthermore, from the supplier＇s perspective, we studied the optimal marketing efforts, product price, and inventory policy considering the two differentproducts simultaneously in the system. We found such decisions are different from the ones we found for analyzing the supply chain with the single contractsetting, which indicates the inconsistency of retailer＇s decision strategy. Lastly, the paper studied the impact of inconsistency of retailer＇s decision strategy on the profit of manufacturer and supply chain coordination. Underdifferent dominating positions （decision power） between retailer and manufacturers, we proposed a solution to cope with the inconsistency of retailer＇s decisionstrategy in order to coordinate and improve the supply chain system.
作者
胡本勇
陈旭
HU Ben-yong CHEN Xu(School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China)
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第2期91-100,共10页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助重点项目(71432003)
中国高校基本科研业务费资助项目(ZYGX2012J122)
关键词
收益共享
策略一致性
产品替代
销售商努力
供应链合作
Revenue sharing
Policies consistency
Product substitutability
Sales effort
Supply chain cooperation
