摘要
本研究应用犯罪经济学中的威慑理论,考察了高管腐败曝光对可比企业高管超额在职消费的威慑效应。基于2008-2015年A股国有上市公司数据的实证结果,我们发现高管腐败曝光对同省份或同行业企业的超额在职消费行为有一定威慑作用。被曝光企业规模越大,惩罚力度越高,威慑效应越明显。可比企业原有腐败水平越高,公司治理质量越差,威慑效应越明显。进一步研究发现,曝光作为一种外部机制能够改善同行业可比企业的未来业绩。本研究拓展了威慑效应理论在微观实证领域的研究,对于客观评价高压反腐的政策实施效果也具有一定参考价值。
Based on deterrent theory in crime economics,this paper examines the deterrent effect of top-executive corruption exposure on peer firm executives' excess perquisites in the capital market. Using sample of Chinese listed state-owned enterprises on A stock market during years 2008-2015,the empirical results show that to a certain extent the deterrent effect exists within the same province or the same industry. The characteristics of both the exposed firms and peer firms can exert significant influence on the extent of such effect. Specifically,this relationship is more eminent when the exposed firm is larger or the penalties are stronger. Besides,as for the peer firm,this relationship is more significant when its degree of original corruption is higher or its internal governance quality is worse. Further result shows that as an external mechanism,the exposure can improve the future performance of peer firms in the same industry. This study extends the studies of crime deterrent effect in micro empirical research and is of valuable reference when making objective evaluation of the effects of anti-corruption campaign.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第5期68-74,共7页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71322201
71272025)的资助
