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EPR下WEEE双渠道回收的模糊定价策略 被引量:1

Fuzzy Pricing Strategy for Dual Channel Recycling of WEEE Under EPR
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摘要 针对WEEE(废弃电器电子设备)处理企业自主回收同时委托回收商回收的双渠道回收逆向供应链系统,在分散决策和集中决策两种情形下,将回收价格视为三角模糊数,运用模糊理论和博弈论的方法研究了处理企业和回收商的模糊回收定价问题,给出了各自回收价格浮动的基准点及浮动范围,并求得了两种情形下模糊利润的期望值.研究表明:在双渠道回收模式下集中决策与分散决策相比,集中决策通过联合定价的方式能使系统的利润达到最大,从而有利于提高系统的整体效率.最后通过算例验证了结论. For the reversed supply chain system of dual channel recycling whereby the WEEE (waste electrical and electronic equipment) processor recycles itself and simultaneously commits its recycling partners to recycle, the recycling price is viewed as a triangular fuzzy number, and the fuzzy theory and game theory are applied to study the fuzzy recycling pricing of processing enterprises and recycling businesses under the decentralized strategy and centralized strategy. The floating reference point and the floating ranges of their respective recycling prices under the two mentioned cases are given, and the expected fuzzy profits are derived as well. It is shown that the centralized strategy can maximize the systematic profits by setting prices together, compared with the decentralized strategy under the dual channel recycling mode; thus,the centralized strategy tends to improve the systematic efficiency. Finally, an example is given to verify the conclusions.
出处 《东北大学学报(自然科学版)》 EI CAS CSCD 北大核心 2017年第6期886-891,共6页 Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271051) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(N140607001) 辽宁省教育厅人文社会科学重点研究基地专项(ZJ2014020)
关键词 生产者责任延伸制(EPR) 废弃电器电子设备(WEEE) 双渠道回收 斯坦克尔伯格博弈 模糊定价 EPR ( extended producer responsibility) WEEE ( waste electrical and electronic equipment) dual channel recycling Stackelberg game fuzzy pricing
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