摘要
结合现实国情,将公众举报作为政府监督的有效来源纳入到政府环境规制与企业生态技术创新行为选择的演化博弈模型中,通过对复制动态方程和演化稳定性的推导分析得到九种不同情形下政府环境规制与企业生态技术创新行为的策略选择,并运用数值仿真演示不同初始值和条件下的演化结果及演化路径,同时分析公众举报概率对政府和企业策略选择的影响。结果发现,较高的公众举报概率可以促进企业选择生态技术创新同时节省政府的监管成本。政府可以通过提高公众的积极参与降低对企业的监管成本,从而完善环境规制的设计,实现经济和环境绩效的双赢。
This paper takes the public report into the evolution game model of the government＇s environmental regulation and the choice of enterprise eco-technology innovation behavior. After the analysis of evolutionary stability, we use numerical simulation to demonstrate the evolution and evolutionary path in nine different initial values and conditions, and analyze the impact of public reporting probability on government and enterprise strategy choice. The results show that the higher probability of public reporting can promote the enterprise to choose the eco-technology innovation and save the cost of government regulation. The government can improve the design of environmental regulation by increasing the participation of the public to realize the win-win situation of economic benefits and environmental benefits.
作者
游达明
杨金辉
YOU Daming YANG Jinhui(Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第12期1-8,共8页
Science and Technology Management Research
关键词
公众参与
环境规制
生态技术创新
演化博弈
public participation
environmental regulation
eco-technology innovation
evolutionary game
