摘要
本文立足中国医药市场,构建双寡头竞争制药企业和集中采购平台间的多阶段动态博弈模型,研究制药企业和采购平台的决策行为,探讨集中采购规制、平台的收费模式和产品差异化战略对制药企业创新激励与药品市场绩效的综合作用机制.研究发现,集中采购规制并非总是降低制药企业的创新激励,而是受到平台收费模式的影响.其次,集中采购不一定能够提高药品市场的配置效率,当且仅当集中采购效率较高时,才能提高药品市场的配置效率.最后,产品差异化战略不仅能缓解市场竞争对制药企业的不利影响,还能提高其创新激励,且对集中采购规制对社会福利的增进具有正向强化效应.本文的研究结论为完善集中采购规制设计,优化集中采购平台的运营及集中采购规制下制药企业的定价和创新决策提供了重要依据.
This paper develops a multi-period dynamic game between duopoly pharmaceutical enterprises and a group procurement platform to analyze their decision-making behaviors and to investigate combining impacts of three factors-group procurement regulation for medicines, procurement platform＇s charging mode, and pharmaceutical enterprises＇ differentiation strategy-on enterprises＇ innovation incentives and the market efficiency based on Chinese medicine market. We find that the group procurement regulation does not lower pharmaceutical enterprises＇ innovation incentives necessarily; the charging mode of procurement platform moderates impacts of group procurement regulation on pharmaceutical enterprises＇ innovation incentives; group procurement does not always improve the allocation efficiency of the market unless the efficiency of group procurement is high enough; differentiation strategies will not only help to relieve negative effects of market competition on pharmaceutical enterprises but to increase their innovation incentives and reinforce the impact of group procurement regulation on social welfare. Results derived are of certain significance to improving the group procurement regulation, optimization of operation on the procurement platform as well as enterprises＇ decision-makings for pricing and innovation strategy.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第6期1557-1567,共11页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家社会科学基金(15BGL074)
天津市哲学社会科学基金(TJGL15-035)
天津市"五个一批"人才项目(2015RC05)~~
关键词
集中采购规制
平台收费模式
创新激励
配置效率
group procurement regulation
platform charging mode
innovation incentives
allocation efficiency
