摘要
本文通过发展塔贝里尼和艾莱斯纳(Tabellini&Alesina)1990年的模型,对官僚执政更替的制度进行探讨,研究官员在异质性偏好和不确定的任职条件下,对于政府债务的影响。研究显示,在执政者偏好异质性和连任不确定性的条件下,地方政府债务在第1期的扩张不可避免。第2期中,地方政府债务的增减在一定的假设条件下取决于官员任职的制度安排,且存在一个制度安排使得无论谁执政,其根据自身理性的最优选择为削减债务,这意味着存在一个制度供给,使得官员自发实现削减债务的良政。实证研究结果显示,政治周期内官员更替次数同债务增速存在显著的负相关关系。本文也借此探讨了官僚制度演化出的自发秩序在债务扩张期和债务存续期对官僚对于债务融资的不同态度和原因。
The paper explores the governors＇ turnover system by improving the model which made by Tabellini and Alesina in 1990, and studies the impact of governors on government debt under heterogeneous preferences and uncertainty of working conditions. It shows that under the conditions of the governors＇ preference heterogeneity and uncertainty of re- election ,local government debt in the first phase of expansion is inevitable. In the second period, changes in local government debt under certain assumptions depends on institutional arrangements of governors＇ appointment, and there is an institutional arrangement that no matter who holds office, the optimal choice is to cut debt assuming he is rational, which means that there is a system that makes governors reduce debt spontaneously. The empirical results show that, within the political cycle, the number of governors＇ turnover is significantly negatively correlated to the debt growth. Moreover, the influence of the spontaneous order of economic outcomes evolved from this bureaucratic system is also discussed.
作者
武彦民
竹志奇
杨峥
WU Yanmin ZHU Zhiqi YANG Zheng(Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Tianjin 30022)
出处
《经济与管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第6期114-121,共8页
Research on Economics and Management
基金
中国经济改革研究基金会研究项目"新型城镇化与地方政府‘土地财政'转型研究"
天津市哲学社会科学规划项目"京津冀协同发展背景下天津市地方政府收入可持续性研究"(TJYY15-016)
天津市"地方公共财政研究"科研创新团队计划"财税体制变革下的地方税建设与公共政策"
关键词
官员更替
政府债务
官僚秩序
地方债务
governors＇ turnover
government debt
bureaucratic order
local debt
