摘要
政府补助的初衷是为了弥补外部性效应造成的企业损失,但是在实际发放过程中,却会受到政府各种偏好的扭曲。利用企业层面的微观数据,实证检验了政府补助中寻租偏好的存在性,考察了权力的地理分布情况对寻租结果的影响。研究发现,寻租活动会显著影响政府资源的分配,但是随着与行政中心距离的增加,寻租活动对获得政府补助的促进作用减弱。考虑到补助发放政策目标的不同,分别控制了创新补贴动机和盈余管理动机后分析表明,创新补贴动机下的政府补助发放仍具有寻租偏好,而盈余管理动机下寻租偏好并不显著。
The purpose of government subsidies is to compensate for corporate losses caused by the external effects. While in the actual payment process, they are distorted by various government preferences. In this paper, using micro-level data at the enterprise level, we test the existence of rent-seeking preferences in government subsidies. Moreover, we also innovatively explore the influence of the geographical distribution of power on rent-seeking results. It is found that rent- seeking activities can significantly affect the allocation of government resources. However, with the increasing of the distance from the administrative center, the role of rent-seeking on the government subsidies is decreasing. Taking the different objectives of policy into account, this paper controls the motivation of innovation and earnings management respectively. The results show that the government subsidy under the innovative motivation still has the rent-seeking preference, While under the earnings management incentive, it is insignificant.
作者
陈兴
韦倩
CHEN Xing WEI Qian(Center for Economic Research, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, P. R. China)
出处
《山东大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第4期65-72,共8页
Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
基金
教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"(NCET-13-0352)
山东大学人文社会科学重大研究项目(13RWZD07)
山东大学青年学者未来计划(2015WLJH17)
关键词
政府补助
寻租
行政距离
创新补贴动机
盈余管理动机
Government subsidies
Rent-seeking
Administrative distance
Innovative motivation
Earnings management motivation
