摘要
通过借鉴现实中的在线渠道运营模式,建立了由一个加盟商和一个在线零售商组成的在线渠道模型,其中在线零售商为主导者,加盟商为跟随者,两参与者销售的是相互间完全替代的产品,并且,将消费者退货的那部分需求在两渠道间转移的情况引入到模型中.分别分析了分散决策和集中决策下的最优决策情况,并对两类决策下的收益情况进行了对比.结果发现,集中决策在一定情况下能够实现渠道总收益的增加.结果还表明,位于约束边界和不在约束边界下的最优决策随各参数的变化情况差异很大.最后,通过激励相容契约和借鉴Nash的议价模型来协调在线渠道.
With the help of reference to the online channel operating mode in reality, we construct an online channel model consist with a franchisee and an online retailer. The products of two participants are substitutes entirely, and the online retailer is the leader of Stackelberg game, but the franchisee is the follower. At the same time, the shift of consumer demand return between two channels is introduced into the model. We analyze the decentralized decision and centralized decision respectively and get the optimal solutions, and then contrast the channel＇s total revenue of two decision situation. The results show that centralized decision can improve the channel＇s total revenue than decentralized decision under certain circumstances. The results also show that the optimal solutions＇ change with the parameters vary widely if they located constraint boundary or not. At last, the online channel is coordinated through an improved revenue sharing contract and the bargaining model of Nash.
作者
王滔
颜波
WANG Tao YAN Bo(School of Economics and Commerce, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510006, China)
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第7期1727-1740,共14页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
广东省自然科学基金(2016A030313485)
广东省哲学社会科学"十二五"规划项目(GD15CGL15)
广东省软科学研究计划项目(2015A070704005)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(2015KXKYJ02)~~
关键词
在线渠道
消费者效用
需求转移
渠道协调
online channel
consumer utility
the shift of demand
channel coordination
