摘要
名实分离现象长期且普遍存在于地方政府权力运行过程,这一现象是地方政府在法律软约束与经济硬约束不平衡情境下的一种行为策略。本文构建了情境-过程的分析框架,通过对组织外情境、组织内情境、行动者、行动结果四个基本要素加以分析,揭示了地方政府权力过程名实分离现象的产生机理,并通过个案研究对此进行了验证。地方政府权力过程的名实分离行为是其处理多元任务困境时,通过对组织内外情境加以理性判断后的选择。一方面,法律软约束与经济硬约束的组织外情境,促使地方政府形成"经济优先、兼顾法治"的治理逻辑;另一方面,在这种逻辑下,地方政府对组织内情境进行局部重构,使其与外部情境相协调,形成效率优先的权力运行规则。由于权力运行的正式规则存在缺陷,难以有效实现效率原则,而非正式规则因具备灵活高效等优势而彰显活力。因此,正式权力的非正式化运作现象大量存在于地方政府的权力过程,甚至超越了现有的法律规定。但法律软约束并非无约束,公然违背正式的权力运行程序有可能遭到责任追究,而名实分离的行为则因其外在形式的合法律性而被地方政府所青睐,作为规避违法风险的理性选择。尽管权力过程的名实分离有其合理性,但暗含权力非法治化的风险,进而滋生腐败、地方政府间合谋等权力异化问题,侵蚀了权力运行的合法性。
The nominal and real’as an effective strategy has been widely used by local governments in China to deal with the task conflict between economic development and rule of law construction.However,Why this strategy was used so widely among local governments and how this phenomenon happens has rarely been explained.This paper attempts to answer these questions.Firstly,this paper proposes a hypothesis that local governments'behavior effected deeply by environment outside and inside the organization and a framework called‘contextual-process’including four elements,namely the situation outside and inside of the organization,the actors,the results.Secondly,on the base of framework,this paper attempts to reveal the mechanism of‘the nominal and real’in local governance.Thirdly,this paper find a case to verify the hypothesis.This paper shows that‘the nominal and real’strategy is a rational choice used by local governments when they faces the conflict between economic development and rule of law construction.On the one hand,the pressure from economic development and rule of law construction is different,the former troubled local governments more than the later.Under this context,local governments formed the behavior logic that‘economic development first and rule of law construction in consideration’.On the other hand,local governments partly reconstructed organization inside to adapt to the organization outside and form the rule of‘efficiency first’to exercise power.However,the formal rules with deficiencies are not suit to the‘efficiency first’rule,while the informal rules obey it because of its flexibility.Thus the phenomenon of informal operation of formal authority exists widely in the process of power exercise among local governments and some behavior of local governments even beyond the present legal provisions.Though the pressure of obeying the laws to the local governments is not so hard,it does regulate their behavior to some extent,because when they broke official process of power exercise,they will probably be called to account.However,by using the strategy of‘the nominal and real’,local governments'behavior appears legal and could escape punishment from the central government.Although it is reasonable to use the strategy of‘the nominal and real’,the risk behind it should not be neglected,because this strategy may lead public power to lose control,bring the problems of corruption and collusion among local governments,and thus shake the legitimacy of whole power system.
出处
《政治学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第4期71-83,共13页
CASS Journal of Political Science
基金
浙江大学"大数据+政府治理"研究成果之一
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2017XZA202)的研究成果
关键词
权力过程
名实分离
经济硬约束
法律软约束
腐败
process of power exercise
the nominal and real
hard constraint
soft constraint
corruption
