摘要
考虑超额收益分配对投资者努力水平的影响,阐述了PPP交通项目中公私部门间的委托代理关系,并在兼顾投资者横、纵向公平偏好的基础上,构建PPP交通项目超额收益最优分配的委托代理模型。在信息不对称的条件下给出最优超额收益分配比例,在最大化公共部门期望效用的同时激励约束投资者投入最佳努力水平。最后对分配结果进行算例分析,为公共部门在选择合作伙伴方面提供相关建议。
This paper studies the influence of the distribution ratio on the level of effort of the investors is put forward, de- scribes the relationship between public and private sectors of the public and private sectors in the PPP traffic project, a prin- cipal agent model for optimal allocation of excess returns in PPP traffic projects is constructed based on the consideration of the horizontal and vertical equity preference. The optimal distribution ratio of excess return is given in the condition of asym- metric information, the proportion of the income is not only maximize the interests of the public sector, but also encourage investors to pay the best level of effort. Finally, the distribution of the results are analyzed and recommendations for the public sector partners is provided.
作者
丰景春
杨圣涛
FENG Jing-chun YANG Sheng-tao(Hohai University Business School Institute of Project Management International River Research Centre, Nanjing 211100 Jiangsu Provincial Collaborative Innovation Center of World Water Valley and Water Ecological Civilization, Nanjing 211100)
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第10期120-124,144,共6页
Soft Science
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目(14AZD024)
国家社会科学基金青年项目(15CJL023)
关键词
PPP交通项目
超额收益分配
公平偏好
委托代理机制
PPP traffic project
excess return distribution
fairness preference
principal agent mechanism
