摘要
探索宅基地退出机制是当前农村综合改革五大关键领域的重要内容,而农村宅基地退出的关键问题是补偿价格。本文的研究表明:自愿退出决策中,农民的要价决策取决于其对宅基地价值的评估值,但农民的评估价格高于政府的评估价格不是退地交易成功的充分条件,贝叶斯纳什均衡的要价博弈策略并不能使参与者的福利状况达到最大化,农村宅基地自愿退出制度的帕累托改进空间尚存。
Residential land exit system is an important part of the current comprehensive reform of rural areas. Compensatory price is the key of this system. The results show that, on the forced situation, peasant＇s strategy depends on the compensation range stipulated by the state law; on the voluntary situation, peasant＇s strategy depends on the expected value of his residential land. Neither of the two NE results is efficient, then it exists the possibility of Pareto Improvement.
出处
《经济体制改革》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第5期83-87,共5页
Reform of Economic System
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"农村土地产权制度改革与农民生产行为优化研究"(16BJY091)
四川省哲学社会科学规划项目"四川省构建农村宅基地自愿有偿退出机制研究"(SC15C032)
关键词
农村宅基地
退出机制
要价博弈
均衡
rural residential land
exit system
bargaining game
equilibrium
