摘要
在需求随机到达的情景下,本文采用了逆推归纳法对库存技术共享零售商联合采购联盟的竞合博弈策略进行研究。首先,在随机需求环境下,确定了库存技术共享零售商联合采购联盟的订货策略及其总的运作成本;其次,得到了零售商进行库存技术共享与联合采购将是可获利的;然后,证明了库存技术共享零售商联合采购合作博弈的核是非空的;最后,分析了如果采用库存技术共享零售商联合采购合作博弈的核的极点的分配方案,将可以促使联盟的库存持有成本降到最低,并通过一个具体的数值例子对此进行了详细地说明。结果表明,库存技术共享零售商联合采购联盟可以通过成本分摊方案的选择,诱导部分零售商对库存技术进行投资改造,从而使相互竞争的库存技术共享零售商联合采购联盟的总成本达到集中化决策时的最低水平。本文所得到的结论将为零售商进行库存技术共享与联合采购的竞合博弈提供可操作性的建议。
Fierce competition between retailers is prevalent nowadays. Because of the scarcity of the land and labor resources under the Internet plus era, many enterprises are upgrading inventory technology in order to reduce operating cost and enhance competitiveness. In addition, retailers often adopt cooperative manners to reduce costs and ＂Joint Purchasing＂ is one of them. During the past few years, it is found that not only purchasing is joined between enterprises, but also inventory technology is shared. For example, Dyer and Nobeoka have done some research on Toyota and discovered that it has established a large network of technology sharing between its suppliers and thus each supplier’s purchasing costs have been minimized. Although the joint purchasing and inventory technology sharing may reduce the total operating cost of retailers’ coalition, how the coalition’s operating cost should be shared among members to prevent some of them from ’free-riding’ will be the key issue that needs to be solved when retailers adopt cooperative manners. At present, although some researchers have done some analysis on the stability of retailers’ joint purchasing coalition, the literature can be classified into categories： deterministic-demanding based and stochastic-demanding. They did not take into account that not only the investment competitive game of inventory technological transformation exists among the retailers; there also exists the cooperative game of inventory sharing and joint purchasing. The differences between this paper and the existing research papers on the retailers joint purchasing coalitions are as follows：（1） deal with not only joint purchasing is implemented among retailers, but also inventory transformation technology is shared among them;（2） discuss not only on the cooperative manners of joint purchasing and inventory sharing technology among retailers, but also about the investment competition among retailers on inventory transformation technology;（3） find an equilibrium scheme of inventory technology upgrading, which can keep the inventory holding cost at the lowest level via the selection of the cost sharing allocation rule of retailers’ joint purchasing coalitions with inventory technology sharing. This paper constructs a two-stage co-opetition game model of retailers’ joint purchasing coalitions with inventory technology sharing based on the assumption of stochastic demands. The sequence of retailers’ decision-making is presented as follows： Stage 1-competitive stage. Retailers will invest in upgrading inventory facilities in order to reduce the inventory holding cost of the products. They will compete against each other to determine its investment level in upgrading the inventory facilities at this stage. Stage 2-cooperative stage. At first, the retailers will share the upgraded inventory technology, which can reduce each retailer’s inventory holding cost to the lowest level. Then retailers will jointly purchase the products. Based on the above two-stage co-opetition game model, this paper has given a detailed analysis via the backwards induction method, i.e., we first analyze the strategies of allocating operating cost at the cooperative stage, and then we discuss the competition strategies of inventory technology transformation at the competitive stage. At the cooperative stage, we derive the optimal purchasing strategy and total operational cost of retailers’ joint purchasing coalition based on the given upgraded inventory technology investment. Then, we prove that the inventory technology sharing and joint purchasing among retailers is profitable, and the grand coalition among retailers can be kept stable via some allocation rules. At the competitive stage, we prove that some retailers are willing to spend more to upgrade their inventory technology, in order to minimize the inventory holding cost for the centralized system, if the adopted allocation rule for retailers’ joint purchasing coalition with inventory technology sharing is the extreme point of the core. Finally, we will give a specific numerical example for detailed illustration. The results obtained in this paper show that the coalition of retailers with inventory technology sharing and joint purchasing via an allocation rule of total cost, which will induce some retailer to invest in upgrading inventory facilities. Therefore, the total cost of the coalition with inventory technology sharing and joint purchasing among competing retailers will be the lowest in the centralized system.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第4期194-199,共6页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71131003)
广东省自然科学基金资助项目(2014A030310443)
教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(15YJC630138)
关键词
库存技术共享
联合采购联盟
竞合博弈
Inventory technology sharing
Joint purchasing coalition
Co-opetition game
