摘要
基于波尔顿等的互联网贷款理论模型,以阿里小贷、Kabbage公司、P2P贷款公司为研究对象,检验了关系型与交易型互联网贷款的信贷风险差异。理论和案例研究表明:属于关系型互联网贷款的阿里小贷和Kabbage公司,形成了基于电子商务的互联网贷款模式,其优势在于动态、连续、充分地掌握了电商的经济行为和资信状况,能迅速准确评估电商的信用风险;而属于交易型互联网贷款的P2P贷款公司,其实质是传统信贷业务的简单互联网化,不仅无助于化解信息不对称引发的信贷风险,而且叠加了网络非面对面识别的风险。因此,应参照银行业监管规则,针对关系型互联网贷款和交易型互联网贷款的风险特征,制定切实可行的监管细则,实现互联网贷款在风险可控范围内的可持续发展。
This paper, based on theoretical model of internet lending from Bolton＇s, makes a case study on All small loans, Kabbage Company, P2P lending companies, and examines credit risk differences between relationship and transaction internet lending. Theory and case study show that All small loans and Kabbage Company which belongs to relational Internet lending have formed internet lending pattern based on electronic commerce, and both have an advantage to dynamically, continuously, sufficiently master economic behavior and credit sta- tus of electronic commerce, and can quickly, accurately assess credit risk of electronic commerce. However, P2P lending companies which belongs to transactional internet lending essentially is that only simply changed traditional credit business into internet, which not only fail to solve credit risk caused by information asymmetry, but also superimpose risk caused by no face to face recognition. Therefore, we should, based on banking regulatory rules, focusing on the risk characteristics of relationship and transaction internet lending, make feasible regulation rules, in order to make internet lending sustainable develop within the acceptable bound of the risk.
出处
《西安交通大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第6期18-26,共9页
Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University：Social Sciences
关键词
互联网贷款
交易型互联网贷款
关系型互联网贷款
信贷风险
银行监管
internet lending
transaction internet lending
relationship internet lending
credit risk
banking supervision
