摘要
朱熹主"理一分殊",认为理在人(心)亦在物,故内外一理,格外可以明内。朱熹认为人心受到蔽染后依然有见(觉知力),但见得不真实不完全,因其有见而可以格心,因所见不明又必须以格外的方式加以校正补充,其格物论亦由此分为格心中之理和格心外之理两路。朱熹格心的方式与阳明学无异,都是在心念起处辨是非,格外的方式主要为读书和应事接物。朱熹的格物论在本质上格内是根本,格外是对格内的补充。格外在朱熹的理论框架内并不妨碍"心即理""心理合一",故王阳明对朱熹格物论"析心与理为二"的论断并不成立。
ZhuXi＇s theory of ＂Li Yi Fen Shu＂ thinks that Li eonsistsin the Xin（ heart or mind） as well as in the objects outside of Xin, and the two kinds oti3 are really the same. Zhu Xi also believes that Xin blurred by QiZhi can still tell what are wrong and right, hut this moral discrimination ability has been greatly restricted and weakened. So if there is no GeWai （seeking Li from outside of Xin） as a supplement to achieve Li, GeXin（ seeking Li from the heart） itselfcan not accomplish the goal of FuM- ingBenXin （ understanding all of the Li）. Zhu Xi＇s GeWuLun is divided into two ways to achieveTianLi ： GeXin and GeWai. If we inspect the the means of theGeXin, we＇ll find there is nothing different from Wang Yangming＇s theory, that is, to distinguish be- tween right and wrong when ideas comes out, and the main approach to GeWu is through reading and dealing with matters in dai- ly life. According to Zhu Xi＇s GeWuLun, GeXin is the prime method, and GeWai is a supplementary way to it in essence. Therefore, we come to the conclusion that GeWai does not contradict with the oneness of Xin and Li in Zhu Xi＇s theoretical framework and that Wang Yangming＇s judgment is wrong of the inconstancy of Xin and Li in Zhu Xi＇s C, eWu Lun.
出处
《学术探索》
北大核心
2017年第12期29-37,共9页
Academic Exploration
基金
第59批博士后基金面上资助项目(2016M592029)
关键词
朱熹
王阳明
格物
心学
心即理
ZhuXi
Wang Yangming
GeWu
XinXue
Xin Ji Li
