摘要
国家治理现代化是全面建设社会主义现代化强国最重要的政治设计,地方政府机会主义是一个值得关注的国家治理议题;消解国家治理现代化亟需的政府公信力、降低国家治理现代化顶层设计的效度、磨损国家治理现代化所需的规则文化显现出地方政府机会主义与国家治理现代化的背离;委托代理关系中的信息不对称、地方自主性的扩展、考核制度设计的偏差以及试点与容错的常态化等都在不同程度上促使了地方政府机会主义的生成;治理地方政府机会主义需要进行多重制度优化。
The modernization of state governance is the most important political design for building a socialist modernization power in an all-round way. As a noteworthy issue on state governance, local government opportunism should be highly concerned about in the process, for it has departed from enhancing state governance to degrading the government credibility, reducing the validity of top-level design and eroding the institutional culture. To some extent,the formation of local government opportunism resulted from the information asymmetry in principal-agent relationship, expansion of local autonomy, deviations in the design of assessment system, normalization of pilots, fault tolerance and so on. To optimize the system in a multiple way is the key in governing the opportunism of local government.
出处
《理论与改革》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第1期123-132,共10页
Theory and Reform
基金
2014年国家社会科学基金重点项目"中国国家治理现代化的战略愿景与路径优化研究"(14AZD009)的阶段性研究成果
关键词
国家治理现代化
地方治理
地方政府机会主义
State governance modernization
Local governance
Local government opportunism
