摘要
为探明溢出效应下政府相关部门管制策略对集群企业安全生产决策的影响,构建了集群企业之间安全生产决策交互的演化博弈模型,分析了系统均衡点的存在性及稳定性,并通过数值仿真的方法展示出集群企业安全生产决策在溢出效应下的演化模式。研究发现:集群企业不同安全生产决策下收益取值的大小会影响系统均衡点的个数和稳定性;在一定范围内,事故企业面临的工伤(亡)赔偿以及经济处罚额度越高,系统越有可能向"安全生产投入"的方向演化;政府相关部门"一刀切整体停产整顿"的管制策略在集群企业之间造成的负外部溢出效应越显著,系统越有可能向"安全生产不投入"的方向演化。
In order to identify governmental regulation strategies for work safety strategies of enterprises under spillover effects in an industrial cluster, a model based on evolutionary game theory that depicts interactions about different work safety strategies of different enterprises is develped to analyze the existence and stability of system equilibria. The evolutionary pattern of work safety strategies of cluster enterprises under spillover effect is demonstrated through numerical simulation. The results indicate： （a） whether there is a equilibrium and how many of them depends on different payoff values of different work safety strategies in cluster enterprises, the system is more likely to evolve towards the desired equilibrium with more fines and injury/death compensation within a reasonable range on the enterprises causing accidents~ （b） the system is more likely to evolve towards the undesired equilibrium in case that the spillover effects between enterprises become more and more significant, which is caused by making all enterprises in the cluster shut down and rectify without distinction on different work safety strategies in different enterprises.
出处
《系统管理学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2018年第1期40-49,56,共11页
Journal of Systems & Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71373104
71403108)
关键词
集群企业
安全生产
演化博弈
溢出效应
管制
cluster enterprise
work safety
evolutionary game theory
spillover effects
regulation
