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基于前景理论的重大基础设施工程风险管理行为演化博弈分析 被引量:37

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Risk Management Behavior of Major Infrastructure Projects Based on Prospect Theory
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摘要 在重大基础设施工程系统复杂性与不确定情况下,风险管理主体的策略选择行为与稳定状态往往受到其角色、利益、风险偏好和感知差异的影响。为了更好地刻画重大基础设施工程风险管理过程中公共部门和私人部门的行为决策动态演变过程,在演化博弈分析中引入前景理论和风险感知因素,通过前景价值和权重函数对传统支付矩阵参数进行修正,分析双方风险管理策略选择过程和演化结果的稳定条件,从风险感知角度诠释双方的行为倾向原因和稳定策略,仿真分析不同参数对演化结果的影响。研究结果表明,双方风险管理行为演化博弈存在5个均衡点,但是由于工程复杂性和主体有限理性产生的认知偏差、乐观偏见和反射及损失效应,使得系统在现实中不易收敛于稳定点并达到最佳风险管理状态,风险管理成本、处罚、风险损失及分担比例等参数对双方行为演化结果产生不同程度的影响,当参数调整通过临界值时能够影响风险管理策略的选择倾向和稳定性。 The strategy choice and stable state of risk management under the system complexity and uncertainty in major infrastructure projects are often influenced by the roles, interests, risk preferences and perceived differences of project parties involved. In order to characterize the dynamic evolution of decision-making behavior of public and private parties in the risk management process of major infrastructure projects, the prospect theory and risk perception factors are combined with the evolutionary game analysis, in which the payment matrix parameters are modified with the prospect value and weight function to analyze the risk management strategy selection process and the stability condition of the evolution result. From a perspective of risk perception, causes of behavioral tendencies and stabilization strategies can be identified and explained clearly. Finally, the influence of different parameters on the evolution results are simulated. The results indicate five equilibrium points in the evolution of risk management behavior. However, due to cognitive biases, optimism bias and reflection and loss effect that are caused by the engineering complexity and limited rationality make the system in reality not easy toconverge to the stable point and achieve optimal risk management status. The parameters, such as risk management cost, penalty, risk loss and sharing ratios, have different effects on the outcome of the two parties' behavioral evolution, the selection tendency and stability of risk strategy can be influenced when parameters are adjusted through critical values.
出处 《系统管理学报》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2018年第1期109-117,共9页 Journal of Systems & Management
基金 国家自然科学基金重大项目(71390522) 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71771067)
关键词 重大基础设施工程 风险管理 前景理论 演化博弈 风险感知 major infrastructure projeets risk management prospect theory evolutionary game riskperception
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