摘要
利用部分地区开展领导干部自然资源资产离任审计试点这一事件,本文研究其是否影响资源型、重污染型上市公司的盈余管理行为。运用双重差分模型,本文发现自然资源资产离任审计降低了公司盈余管理程度,抑制了正向和负向利润操纵。此外,领导干部自然资源资产离任审计对相关公司盈余管理程度的影响在大小公司以及不同产权公司之间不存在显著差异,但在制度环境差的地区影响更大。
Utilizing the event that some areas carry out pilot of local governors' accountability audit of natural resource,this paper investigates whether it will affect earnings management for resourcebased and heavily polluting companies.Using DID model regression,this paper finds local governors' accountability audit of natural resource reduces the degree of earnings management,including suppressing manipulating profits up and down.In addition,there is no significant difference between different companies and property companies for the above impact,but it has a greater earnings management degree in areas with poor institutional environment.This study enriches the political cost theory,and raises understanding economic consequences for local governors' accountability audit of natural resource.
出处
《中南财经政法大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第1期13-23,共11页
Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"审计师处罚的溢出效应研究"(71702032)
福建省社会科学研究基地重大项目"领导干部自然资源资产离任审计对资源型
重污染型企业投融资行为的影响研究"(2016JDZ040)
关键词
领导干部自然资源资产离任审计
政治成本
盈余管理
Local Governors' Accountability Audit of Natural Resource
Political Cost
Earnings Management
