摘要
本文基于我国上市公司2006-2014年实施股权激励的数据,研究公司在业绩型股权激励计划实施过程中的盈余管理问题。我们发现,实施股权激励计划的上市公司存在明显的行权业绩条件"踩线"达标现象,即报告业绩刚刚达成股权激励方案要求的行权业绩条件,这一现象意味着公司很可能为股权激励业绩达标而进行了盈余管理。通过进一步研究我们发现,行权业绩条件"踩线"达标的股权激励公司的真实盈余管理程度显著高于其他股权激励公司,而且这些"踩线"达标公司存在更少的正向应计盈余管理和更高的负向应计盈余管理。这些发现说明,真实盈余管理是"踩线"达标公司达成股权激励行权业绩条件的关键手段,它们同时还通过应计盈余管理为后续业绩考核期间储备利润。本研究还提示,监管机构和公司董事会要重视公司在股权激励计划设计、决策和实施过程中的盈余管理及其可能引致的激励扭曲问题,改进行权业绩条件所依据的业绩指标和业绩标准,同时更好地平衡被激励对象的激励及其承担的薪酬风险。
Based on a hand collected data set of Chinese listed firms with performance-based equity incentive plans during 2006-2014, we investigate the earnings management behavior during the implementation period of such plans. Our paper documents that there is an apparent ＂slightly target-meeting＂ phenomenon among those firms, in other words, the reported performance indicators such as the return on net assets and net income growth rate slightly beat or meet the targeted numbers required by the incentive plans for abnor- mally many firms. This phenomenon suggests that these firms man- age earnings to meet or slightly beat the target. Our further study figures out that, compared to the other firms with equity incentive plans, the level of real earnings management done by these ＂slight- ly target-meeting＂ firms is significantly higher than that of other firms, and these firms also have less upward as well as more downward accrual earnings management. The above patterns between real and accrual earnings management have two implications： （1） It is real earnings management instead of accrual manipulations that serve as the key instrument to help firms with performance-based equity incentive plans beat the required performance target; （2） The ＂slightly target beating firms＂ also build ＂earnings reservoirs＂ through cutting upward and increasing downward accrual earnings management as much as possible to meet the performance require- ment in the remaining periods. The above findings indicate that the commonly adopted schemes of ＂100% get it or 100% lose it＂ and ＂no defer＂ in equity incentive plans lead to incentive distortions, real earnings management, which hurts firms＇ long-term interests con trary to the original intention of equity incentive plans. Therefore, regulators and board of directors should keep an eye on the earnings management and incentive distortion problem during the whole timeline of an equity incentive plan, improve the design of perfor mance indicators and make a better balance between incentive and compensation risk bearing.
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第1期159-171,共13页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71672 0 98)
财政部"会计名家培养工程"资助
关键词
业绩型股权激励
“踩线”达标
真实盈余管理
应计盈余管理
Performance-based Equity Incentive Plan
＂Slightly Target-meeting＂
Real Earnings Management
Accrual-based Earn- ings Management
