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平台领导的实质选择权 被引量:46

Real Options in Platform Leadership
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摘要 平台领导是平台的创建者和生态的协调者。泛平台化时代,平台领导以高度战略弹性快速敏捷地识别、分析和利用动荡及不确定性环境,创造线性企业难以企及的商业传奇。运用实质选择权灵活应对环境不确定性,构建战略弹性,获取非对称收益,是当今平台领导具备旺盛生命力的原因所在。本文归纳了五种平台领导的实质选择权基本类型,并分别论述每种选择权的定义、价值形态和边界条件。在此基础上,以平台领导战略选择为切入点,剖析平台领导嵌入实质选择权的内在运行机理。平台领导实质选择权利用多边市场构建、平台领导多重互补角色、平台模块化架构和平台策展体系的非对称决策,创造平台领导的战略弹性,并通过提高平台市场有效性、扩大积极网络效应、增加依赖优势、推动场景创新和强化系统锁定,获得专属非对称收益。"杠杆"、权变和价值专属逻辑是构建和运用实质选择权的核心要义,也是平台领导和生态系统快速成长的理论内核。 Platform leadership is the creator of the platform and the coordinator of ecology. In the era of pan-platform, platform leadership with high degree of strategic flexibility is to quickly identify, analyze and use the turbulent and uncertain environment, creating a business legend which pipelines are difficult to match. The reason why platform leadership has strong vitality lies in the process which platform leaderships construct strategic flexibility and capture asymmetric profits when they confront environmental uncertainty. This paper summarizes five basic types of real options in platform leadership, and respectively discusses the definition, value form and boundary conditions of each option. Based on the strategic choice of platform leadership, we analyze the inherent mechanism of embedded real option in platform leadership. We put forward that real option of platform leadership creates the strategic flexibilities by asymmetric decisions in construction of muhisided markets, platform leadership's multiple complementary roles, platform modular architecture and platform curation system, thus can promote market effectiveness, enlarge positive network effect, improve dependence advantage and strengthen system locking, and finally capture exclusive asymmetric profits. We insist that "leverage", contingency and value appropriation logics are not only the essence of applications of real option, but also the theoretical core for rapid growth of platform leadership and platform ecosystem.
作者 罗珉 杜华勇 LUO Min;DU Hua-yong(School of Business and Administration, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130, China)
出处 《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2018年第2期82-99,共18页 China Industrial Economics
关键词 平台领导 实质选择权 不确定性 战略弹性 platform leadership real option uncertainty strategic flexibility
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