摘要
在我国行政组织法的发展与变革中,地方政府创生了一种在行政法理论体系上完全找不到对应的新型制度,它往往被称为"行政权力挂起",是地方组织法的新变式。从对地方立法实践的观察来看,它是附随在权力清单制度中推进的,是为了应付权力清单运动而催生的新型权力编排方式。但是,它既不是对行政权力的创设,也不是消灭,而只是采用一定的程序将行政权力予以冻结,被冻结的权力既可能会被长期封存,也可能会被即时解封或启挂。从法律评价上来看,被挂起的行政权力可能会面临"是否具有合法性"、"是否构成违法性阻却事由"等多方面问题,尽管从理论层面上来说,这些问题可以在行政自制的制度定位中获得一定的解释。但是,这仍然不够,我们还需要从规范层面进行更为正式的制度化布置,并从法律效力上划定这一政治活动的最终边界,从而促使其从政治行为向法律行为转变,从封闭行为向开放行为转变。
During the development and reformation of China~ administrative organization law, local governments have created a brand-new system. The new variant of local organization law, known as ＂administrative power suspension＂, has no clue in the existing administrative law theory system. From the perspective of local legislation practice, power list campaign has brought out power suspension, the new arrangement of administrative power attached to the power list system. However, power suspension is not to create or eliminate administrative power, but to freeze it according to certain procedures. The frozen power will be suspended for long or unfrozen at any time. Legally, the suspended administrative power may be confronted with problems, such as ＂ whether it has legality＂, and ＂ whether it constitutes the cause of illegality deterrence＂. Although these problems could be explained on the basis of administrative self-restraint theory, power suspension, as a political activity, is still in the need of institutionalization from normative perspective and clearness in legal validity. Power suspension is supposed to transform from a political act to a legal act, from a closed act to an open act.
出处
《中国法学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第1期265-283,共19页
China Legal Science
基金
2015年度国家社科基金青年项目"适合我国的行政裁量权基准制度构建研究"(项目批准号:15CFX021)资助
江苏高校区域法治发展协同创新中心成果
