摘要
激励机制的有效性会对管理者行为产生影响,从而影响公司融资等财务决策,而对管理者的绩效进行合理的评价是激励机制发挥作用的前提。本文以2010年国资委大力推行EVA考核为切入点,借助2007-2012年我国国有上市公司数据,采用双重差分法,实证检验实施EVA考核对企业融资结构的影响。研究发现,实施EVA考核对央企提升总体负债水平起到了促进作用;进一步地,本文对债务的期限结构进行了划分,发现EVA考核对短期负债的影响大于对长期负债的影响。本文为高管激励影响融资结构的研究提供了新的研究视角,同时也为EVA考核制度的完善及推广提供了理论与经验借鉴。
The efficiency of an incentive mechanism can affect managements＇ behavior. Sequentially, it can affect the financial decision-making, such as financing. The precondition that an incentive mechanism plays incentive role is to evaluate management reasonably. Treating the carrying out EVA performance evaluation of State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission （SASAC） in 2010 as an entry point, this paper examine effects of EVA performance evaluation on financing structure with Difference-in-Differences （DID） model and data of State-owned Listed Companies from 2007 to 2012. The result shows the implement of EVA Performance evaluation has positive effect on enhancing leverage ratio. Furthermore, it has more effects on short-term debts than long-term debts. This paper provides a new view of the research of effects of executive incentive on financing structure. Moreover, it provides theoretical and practical reference to the perfecting and promoting EVA Performance Evaluation by the SASAC.
作者
李昕潼
池国华
LI Xin-tong, CHI Guo-hua
出处
《科学决策》
CSSCI
2018年第1期75-94,共20页
Scientific Decision Making
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(项目编号:71372069)
关键词
EVA考核
融资结构
短期负债
长期负债
EVA performance evaluation
financing structure
short-term debts
long-term debts
