摘要
以财政部颁布的"中央国有企业上交国有资本收益"有关政策为背景,笔者考察了中央国有企业强制分红政策的市场反应。研究发现,强制分红政策整体上会引起负面市场反应,但在代理成本不同的企业之间存在显著差异,具体而言:在代理成本较高的企业里,市场反应较为正面。上述发现表明投资者预期强制分红具有改善公司治理的功用。利用中央国有企业强制分红这一"准自然实验",本文克服了以往研究中的内生性问题,有关结论不仅丰富了股利领域的研究成果,而且对于完善我国的强制分红政策具有重要的参考价值。
Taking the related policy for turning over earnings of central state-owned enterprises （SOEs） as research background, this study investigates the market reaction of the mandatory pay-out policy. We find that the mandatory pay-out policy overall leads to negative market reaction, and the market reaction pattern va- ries with firms＇ agency cost. Specifically, the market reaction is relatively positive when firms bear more agen- cy cost. These findings suggest that dividend has governance function in investors＇ expectation. This study ad- dresses the endogeneity problems by exploiting the quasi-experiment of mandatory pay-out policy of the central SOEs. The conclusion of this study adds to the literature ving the mandatory pay-out policy. on dividend and has important implications for improving the mandatory pay-out policy.
作者
许浩然
廖冠民
XU Hao-ran;LIAO Guan-min
出处
《中央财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第4期53-62,共10页
Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"劳动保护
人力资本专用性与公司价值:基于新<劳动合同法>的实证检验"(项目编号:71272233)
关键词
央企强制分红
市场反应
代理成本
Mandatory pay-out policy of central SOEs Market reaction Agency cost
