摘要
为探究个体名声效应嵌入到农村集体行动后不同主体间的博弈行为,利用博弈论的研究方法,对个体农户和农村合作社组织的合作博弈均衡机制进行研究。结果表明,在限制成员退出而构成的重复博弈环境下,只要建立起合理的监督与惩罚机制,名声效应会对合作社成员和农民个体的机会主义行为抑或是搭便车行为形成有效约束,从而促成农村合作社组织以及农民个体之间的良性集体行动。
To explore the game theory between different subjects after individual reputation effect was taken into rural collective action,the cooperative game equilibrium mechanism between individual farmer and the rural cooperative organization was investigated using research methods of game theory.The results showed that：Under the repeated game environment caused by restricting the withdrawal of members,as long as establishing the reasonable mechanism of supervision and punishment,the reputation effectively activated the constraint of opportunistic behavior or free-riding behavior about members of cooperatives and individual farmers,which could promote the of sound collective action of individual farmers with rural cooperative organization.
作者
詹国辉
张新文
ZHAN Guohui1, ZHANG Xinwen2(1. School of Public Administration, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjing 210023, China; 2. College of Public Administration, Nanjing Agricultural University, Nanjing 210095, Chin)
出处
《中国农业大学学报》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2018年第6期210-218,共9页
Journal of China Agricultural University
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(14BGL150)
农业部软科学研究项目(K201719-1)
河北省社会科学发展研究课题(201708110317)
清华农村研究博士论文奖学金项目(201711)
关键词
名声效应
集体行动
重复博弈
个体农户
农村合作社组织
reputation effech collective action
cooperative game
farmer
rural cooperative organization
