摘要
在平台企业对新老用户实施歧视定价策略下,通过构建用户单归属情形下三平台Salop竞争模型,考察并比较平台横向合并对歧视定价均衡的影响。研究表明,发生横向合并后,平台对新老用户的歧视定价以及其获得的利润与交叉网络外部性有关;在不考虑成本节约的情形下,与横向合并前相比,合并行为发生后,无论是否作为合并参与方,平台将不必然对新用户进行优惠,且歧视定价策略的制定取决于交叉网络外部性的大小。此外,平台企业的利润较合并前提高或降低同样取决于双边用户间交叉网络外部性的大小。上述结论有助于平台企业判断其横向合并的可行性与合理性,或作为其调整横向合并后歧视定价的依据;同时,也为有关规制部门维护市场秩序提供参考。
Based on the discriminatory pricing strategy of platform enterprise to new and old users,this paper builds a Salop model with three single-homing-user platforms competing against each other to analyze and compare the effect of platform horizontal merger on discriminatory pricing equilibrium. The result shows that the discriminatory pricing of platforms to the old and new users is related to the cross network externality after the horizontal merger; without considering cost saving factor,the result also shows that it is not necessary for platforms no matter the merged party or the non-merged party to give preferential treatment to new users,and platform＇s discriminatory pricing strategy depends on the size of the cross network externality. In addition,whether platforms＇ profit will increase or decrease after merge depends on the size of the cross network externalities. The above conclusions are helpful for the platform enterprises to judge the feasibility and rationality of the horizontal merger,or as the basis for the adjustment of the pricing of discrimination after the horizontal merger. At the same time,it also provides reference for the relevant regulatory departments to maintain market order.
作者
李治文
韩启然
熊强
LI Zhi-wen;HAN Qi-ran;XIONG Qiang(School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China)
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第5期133-141,共9页
Commercial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目
项目编号:71302087
中国博士后科学基金项目
项目编号:2015M571708
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目
项目编号:16YJA630001
江苏省博士后基金项目
项目编号:1402104C
关键词
平台企业
横向合并
歧视定价
platform enterprise
horizontal merger
discriminatory pricing
