摘要
费用粘性是公司财务和公司治理领域的研究热点问题。本文基于2009~2015年沪深上市公司数据,实证检验了董事高管责任险对上市公司费用粘性的影响。研究发现,董事高管责任险对上市公司费用粘性具有显著的抑制作用;公司治理水平或外部治理环境分组回归的结果显示,董事高管责任险对治理水平较低或外部治理环境较差的上市公司费用粘性的抑制作用更为显著,而对治理水平高或治理环境好的公司不存在显著影响。本文肯定了董事高管责任险抑制公司费用粘性的积极作用,且把董事高管责任险这一重要的外部治理机制引入到费用粘性动因的研究范围之中。
Stickiness of cost is a hot topic in the field of corporate finance and corporate governance. Based on the data of Chinese listed companies from 2009 - 2015, the effects of directors＇ and officers＇ liability insurance （ D＆O Insurance） on stickiness of cost were tested. The results showed that D＆O Insurance could restrain the stickiness of cost. The categorized regression analysis showed that, the restraining function was more significant for the lower level of corporate governance and worse external governance environment than otherwise. The paper confirmed the positive effect of D＆O Insurance on stickiness of cost, and put D＆O Insurance, an important external governance mech- anism, into the research framework on stickiness of cost.
作者
凌士显
白锐锋
LING Shixian;BAI Ruifeng
出处
《保险研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第5期73-86,共14页
Insurance Studies
基金
山东省社科项目"金融结构优化与经济增长方式转变关系研究"(15CJJJ16)
关键词
董事高管责任险
费用粘性
机会主义
公司治理
Directors＇ and Officers＇ Liability Insurance
stickiness of cost
opportunism
corporate governance
