摘要
如何通过分类治理驱动国有企业创新、释放创新红利是国有企业深化改革的重要命题。本文以转轨经济阶段的中国国有控股上市公司为研究对象,考察了不同类型国有公司控股方治理机制对控股公司创新红利释放的影响。结果发现,公司控股方根据各类型国有控股公司创新功能定位选择相匹配的治理模式,才能有利于创新红利释放。相对而言,一般商业类公司控股方加强激励和控制机制作用,放松约束机制,有利于创新红利释放;而对于特定功能类公司,控股方的激励机制对创新红利释放的作用效果不显著,需要强化控制和约束机制作用。从产业技术视角进一步研究发现,一般商业类高技术型公司控股方的激励机制对创新红利释放作用更为显著,对于特定功能类高技术型公司,控股方加强控制机制作用更有利于创新红利释放,而非高技术(资本密集)型公司强控制、强约束的控股方治理模式对创新红利释放更为有效。同时发现,延长国有公司控股方股权金字塔层级,对一般商业类公司控股方激励机制的驱动作用更为显著,而特定功能类公司控股方约束机制作用发生反向变化,即在放权制度情景下弱化国有公司控股方约束机制有利于特定功能类公司创新红利释放。
The issue on how to drive the innovation of state-owned enterprises through the classified governance and release the inno- vation bonus is an important proposition of deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises. In this article Chinese state-owned listed companies in the transitional economy are taken as the re- search object and the influence of the controlling party governance of different types of state-owned companies on the release of the controlling shareholder＇s innovative bonus is examined. The results show that the company controlling party chooses the matching governance mode according to the orientation of innovative func- tions of various types of state-owned companies, which will be beneficial to the release of innovation bonus. Relatively speaking, the controlling parties of the general commercial companies should strengthen the role of incentives and control mechanisms and also the relax the restraint mechanism, which will be beneficial to the release of innovation bonus. However, the incentive mechanism ofcertain functional companies has no significant effect on the release of innovation bonus and needs to strengthen the role of control and supervision mechanism. Further study from the perspective of the industrial technology finds out that the incentive mechanism of the general commercial high-tech companies is more significant for the release of innovation bonus; for the specific functional high- tech companies, the controlling shareholder strengthens the role of control mechanism is more conducive to the release of innovative bonus; while for the non-high-tech （capital-intensive） companies~ their strong control and strong restraint of the controlling party＇s governance model is more effective in releasing innovative bonus. The results also shows that the extending equity pyramid level of the state-owned company＇s controlling party, the general commer- cial companies＇ incentive mechanism is more significant. As for the specific functional companies, the function of constraint mecha- nism changes inversely. That is, under the scenario of decentraliza- tion system, weakening the restraint mechanism of the state owned company controlling party is beneficial to the release of innovative bonus for the specific functional comoanies.
作者
徐伟
张荣荣
刘阳
刘鹏
Xu Wei;Zhang Rongrong;Liu Yang;Liu Peng(School of Business, Jinan Universit)
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第3期90-102,共13页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目(16AGL008)
国家社会科学基金一般项目(14BGL046)
国家社科基金青年项目(13CJY004)资助
关键词
分类治理
控股方治理机制
创新红利
国有企业
Classification Governance
Controlling Party Governance Mechanism
Innovation Dividend
State-owned Enterprises
