摘要
公司违规行为的影响因素一直是理论与实务两界的关注焦点。本文着眼于战略维度,探究了公司战略对公司违规行为的影响。结果表明:首先,相比防御型公司,进攻型公司的违规倾向更高、违规次数更多。其次,本文考察了公司战略对公司违规行为的影响机制,发现良好的信息环境、完善的内部控制、聘任稳健型的高管能够约束进攻型公司的违规行为。进一步研究表明,公司被稽查的概率与其战略类型无关,排除了稽查概率对结论的干扰;进攻型公司的盈利能力好于防御型公司,否定了进攻型公司通过违规行为改善业绩的猜想;区分违规类型后,发现公司战略的影响在经营违规和领导人违规中更为明显,而在信息披露违规中较弱。本文将战略理论与公司违规相结合,丰富了这两个领域的研究,同时为发现与约束公司违规行为提供了新的线索与依据。
Corporate frauds pose a serious threat to investors＇ bene- fits, companies＇ continuing operations and capital market＇s healthy development. Therefore, the contributing factors of corporate frauds have been the focused topic in both theory and practice. As the busi- ness objective and decision-making guidance, corporate strategy determines the company＇s business mode and organizational struc- ture, which indicates that corporate strategy could be a key factor in impacting corporate frauds. Based on the sample of Chinese A-share listed company data from 2007 to 2016, we examine the relationship between corporate strategy and corporate frauds. Our findings sug- gest that corporate strategy has a significant impact on corporate frauds. Compared to defenders, prospectors are more likely to have stronger fraud tendency and larger fraud frequency. In addition, we investigate the influencing mechanism of corporate strategy on corporate frauds, and find that corporate frauds of prospectors can be restrained by good information quality, improving internal con- trol system, employing risk-aversion managers. In further study, we rule out two competing hypotheses. First, we investigate whether corporate strategy will affect the likelihood of fraud detection and find that no significant relationship exists between them, ruling out the impact that the likelihood of fraud detection may have on our conclusions. Second, we examine the relationship between corpo- rate performance and corporate frauds and find that the prospectors＇ overall profitability is significantly better than those of defenders, rejecting the viewpoint that prospectors improve their performance by rule-breaking behavior. After distinguishing the types of corpo- rate frauds, we find that the influence of corporate strategy is much stronger in operating frauds and executives＇ frauds, while weaker in disclosure frauds. Besides, after changing the measurement of corporate strategy and addressing the endogeneity of the regression model by two instrumental variables, our conclusions are still ro- bust. This paper focuses on the perspective of strategic theory, and examines the contributing factor of corporate frauds, which enrich- es both research fields and provides new clues and basis for discov- ering and restraining the corporate frauds.
作者
孟庆斌
李昕宇
蔡欣园
Meng Qingbin;Li Xinyu;Cai Xinyuan(School of Business, Renmin University of China;Fujian Tendering and Purchasing Group Limited Company)
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第3期116-129,151,共15页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71772174
71772173)
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71302156)资助
关键词
公司战略
公司违规
影响机制
Corporate Strategy
Corporate Frauds
Influencing Mechanism
