摘要
构建了两条竞争的双层旅游供应链模型,基于供应链成员权力的差异,讨论了一条供应链的成员进行Stackelberg博弈,另一条供应链的成员进行Nash博弈的混合情形下的竞争均衡解。结果表明,采用Nash博弈是旅游供应链的占优策略,且该策略能弥补旅游供应链服务能力的不足;当旅游供应链具有突出的服务效率,Nash博弈就会带来更高的获益幅度;Nash博弈会增加整条供应链的利益,但同时也损害了服务提供商的利益。为了实现个体利益和集体利益的协调,设计了旅行社向服务提供商的转移支付机制,以避免"囚徒困境"现象的发生。
In this paper,two competing two-level supply chain models is constructed. Based on the differences of supply chain members＇ rights,the competitive equilibrium in this situation is discussed： a member of one chain carries out Stackelberg game,while a member of the other chain carries out Nash game. The results show that Nash game is the dominant strategy of tourism supply chain,and this strategy can make up for the deficiency of tourism supply chain service capabilities. The more efficient the tourism supply chain is,the higher profit Nash game brings. Although it can increase the interests of the whole supply chain,Nash game harms the interests of service providers. In order to realize the coordination of individual interests and collective interests,the transfer payment mechanism of travel agencies to service providers is designed so as to avoid the occurrence of ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂.
作者
梁逸更
LIANG Yigeng(Department of Economic Management, Maoming Vocational Technical College, Maoming 525000 , Chin)
出处
《广东石油化工学院学报》
2018年第2期50-55,共6页
Journal of Guangdong University of Petrochemical Technology
基金
茂名市社科联重点课题(2017ZD05)
